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SENT BY COM.M''^nF. 0*-I AM^.P^CA^ r)oor»AOANDA. AND 



r\T]7r' 



'^N. 



THE TRAGEDY OF THIRTEEN 
DAYS IN 1914. 



(A review of tlie diplomatic correspondence preceding the World War of 
1914.) 



An address before the Michigan State Bar 
Association, June 28, 1918. 



HORACE L. WILGUS, 
Professor of- Law, University of INIichigan. 



am 



J] 511 



PKEFATORY NOTE. 

The substance of the following pages was read from notes, in an 
address in June to the Michigan State Bar Association. The Bar 
Association passed a resolution providing for the printing of the same. 

The "notes" were not then in shape for printing; in preparing them 
for printing, I have quoted more fully the exact language of the 
documents, and in a few places made fuller statements, than were 
possible in the time limits of the address; otherwise the matter is 
the same. I have made an effort to give the exact citation for every 
important sentence from the documents. 

The purpose has been to give as clear, concise, and accurate a 
statement, — with a maximum of the exact language used, and a 
minimum of comment, — of the diplomacy immediately preceding the 
war. 

At the time the address was given I had read the Collected 
Documents, Beck's Evidence in the Case, and part of Headlam's 
Twelve Bays. Since then I have examined with considerable care, 
the most important books in the annexed bibliography. I have found 
no sufficient reasons for changing the conclusions already formed 
and expressed herein. I have however added a few notes based on 
some of these other authorities. 

Any one who has read Mr. Beck's Evidence in the Case, will realize, 
as I do, how greatly I am indebted to him. Soon after the Collected 
Documents were printed in 1915, I received a copy through the 
courtesy of Sir Gilbert Parker. I read much of the material therein, — 
but w^as much confused by the semi-chronological arrangement by 
countries, which of course is the only proper official way; but it is ex- 
tremely difficult to make out the connected story for all the countries, 
and the index alone gives but little help. 

Sometime later I read Mr. Beck's book, and made extensive notes; 
I then undertook to verify them from the documents themselves; this 
was interesting and fascinating, but to get the full effect, I found 
that something like a concordance to the documents was necessary. 
I made one for my own use, and began the systematic study of the 
documents, for my own satisfaction, without thought of publication; 
while my conclusions are the same as Mr. Beck's and Mr. Archer's, 
they are based on my own study of the documents themselves; and 
it seems to me that any one with an open mind will be led irresistibly 
to the same conclusion by a like study. 

This paper cannot take the place of such a study, or of the larger 



works, but it is hoped tliat many, who have not the time to read 
more extensively, may find here a sufficient basis for feeling that 
"thrice is he armed, who has liis quarrel just." 

As much as possible I have used England, for Great Britain, 
Austria for Austria-Hungary, and Germany, for the German Empire; 
and also, the same, instead of the name of the particular official repre- 
sentative of the country, when it seemed unnecessary to be more 
specific. 

In 1914, I thought it probable the outbreak of the war was due 
much to bungling, and Machiavellian diplomacy, by incompetent 
diplomats, all being much, if not equally, to blame. I have been 
driven to the conclusion that, while that is true of the Central Powers, 
it is not true of the Allies; the latter, in my judgment, have been 
represented by high-minded, able men, — Sir Edward Grey, (England), 
Rene Viviani, (Prance), and M. Sazonof, (Russia), who did every 
thing they could honorably and honestly do to avoid v/ar; while those 
of the Central Powers, — the Kaiser, Bethmann-Hollweg, Chancellor, 
and Von Jagow, Secretary of State, (Germany), and Berchtold, 
(Austria), neither high-minded, nor so able, but vicious, did every- 
thing they could dishonorably and dishonestly to pretend to avoid a 
war which they had deliberately planned for their own iniquitous 
ends, — Austria to dominate Servia and the Balkans, and Germany to 
dominate Europe and the world. 

Ann Arbor, Aug. 15, 1918. 



SHORT BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Adkins, The War, Its Origins and Warnings, London, Unwin, 1914, 
227 pp. 

Andrassy, Count Julius, Whose Sin is the World War? New York, 
New Era Pub. House, 1915, 154 pp. (Pro-Austrian.) 

Archer, Wm., The Thirteen Days— July 23-August 4, 1914, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1915, 244 pp. ("Very excellent review.) 

Baldwin, E. F., The World War, How it looks to the Nations in- 
volved and what it means to us. New York, MacMillan, 1914, 267 pp. 

Beck, James M., The Double Alliance versus the Triple Entente, Ox- 
ford Pamphlets No. VIII, 1914, reprinted from the New York Times, 
44 pp. (Best short statement.) 

Beck, James M., The Evidence in the Case, New York, Putnams, 1914, 
200 pp. (One of the very best statements, indispensable.) 

Chitwood, O. P., The Immediate Causes of the Great War, New 
York, Crowell, 1917, 196 pp. (An absolutely colorless account.) 

Collected Documents. See page 15, infra. 

Dampierre, Jacques M. de, German Imperialism and International 
Law, London, Constable, 1917, 277 pp. 

Davenport, B., A History of the Great War, 1914 — , New York, 
Putnams, 1916, 545 pp. 

Dillon, Dr. B. J., A Scrap of Paper, 3d Ed., London, Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1914, xxvii, 220 pp. 

Durkheim, E. and Denis, E., Who Wanted War? Paris, Librarie 
Armand Cohn, 1915, 63 pp. (Excellent short statement.) 

Headlam, J. W., A History of Twelve Days, July 24th to August 
4th, 1914, London, Unwin, 1915, 412 pp. (Excellent.) 

Kennedy, J. M., How the War Began, London, Hodder and Stough- 
ton, 1914, xxvii, 187 pp. 

Ludwig, Ernest, Austria-Hungary and the War, New York, Ogilvie, 
1915, 220 pp. (Pro-Austria.) 

Meyer, Eduard, England, Its Political Organization and Developement 
and the War against Germany, Boston, Ritter, 1916, 328 pp. (Pro- 
German. With this should be read Britain versus Germany, by J. 
M. Robertson, London, Unwin, 1917, — a review of Meyer's book.) 

Mowat, R. B., Select Treaties and Documents, Oxford Pamphlets, No. 
XVIII, Oxford Univ. Press, 1914-1915, 127 pp. 

Price, M. P., The Diplomatic History of the War, New York, Scrib- 
ner, 1914, 344+102 pp. (Contains many valuable documents and news- 



paper accounts, speeches, etc. So anti-Grey as to be almost pro- 
German. See Archer's criticisms in Appendix to Thirteen Days.) 

Rose, J.H., The Origins of the War, New York, Putnams, 1915, 
201 pp. 

Schmitt, B. E., England and Germany, 1740-1914, Princeton Univ. 
Press, 1916, 524 pp. (Excellent for many things, especially the army 
and navy building competition.) 

Seymour, Charles, The Diplomatic Background of the War, 1870- 
1914, Yale Univ. Press, 1914, 331 pp. 

Stowell, E. C, The Diplomacy of the War of 1914, New York, Hough- 
ton, 1915, pp. (Very careful and judicial study, with many documents, 
and the best chronological table of the diplomatic events.) 

Willimore, J. S., The Great Crime and its Moral, London, Hodder 
and Stoughton, 1917, 223 pp. (Valuable.) 



THE TRAGEDY OF THIRTEEN DAYS IN 1911. 
INTRODUCTION. 

The tragedy of which I shall speak this afternoon is the one that 
is revealed in the Diplomatic Correspondence of Europe, from July 
23 to August 4, 1914, inclusive, immediately preceding and ending 
in the commencement of the World War. The occasion -of this 
correspondence was the murder of the heir to the Austrian throne, 
on June 28, 1914, — four years ago today. 

A very short historical review is necessary to understand the 
situation. 

We speak of English, French, German, Italian, and Russian peoples, Racee and 
and Teutonic and Slavic races, as if they were separate and distinct ^*^°'' ^^' 
races; these distinctions, however, are based more on language and 
nationality, than on real racial characteristics, of a hereditary nature, 
such as stature, shape of the head, and color of the eyes, hair, and 
skin. Race, language, and nationality are now considered distinct 
things, and are rarely co-extensive; racial lines, more frequently, cut 
across both national and linguistic groupings. Recent investigators 
agree that "the living people of Europe consist of layer upon layer 
of diverse" populations, one after another having been submerged for 
a time by new comers, who have in later centuries been bred out, in 
considerable degree, by their conquered predecessors. This is so to 
such an extent in Europe today that "in the majority of cases, the 
citizen of any European nation carries within himself a mixture of 
every race which made its appearance in Europe," and "from the 
racial point of view the present war is to a certain extent a civil 
war."^ Yet the history of Europe has largely been made up of the 
struggles between national groups — between French and German, 
Slav and Teuton. There are today perhaps, about 94 millions of 
Germans in Europe, of whom 64 millions are in Germany, 12 millions 
in Austria, and the remainder in the immediately adjacent countries. 
There are, too, some 140 millions of Slavs, comprising the Eastern, 
(Russia, Lithuania, Ruthenia), about 100 millions; the Western, 
(Poles, Czechs, Slovaks), about 25 millions, in a compact mass imme- 
diately adjoining the Germans on the east and north; and the South- 
ern, (Bulgarians, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes), about 15 millions 
in a compact mass south of the Danube river to the Agean sea. 



1. See Osborn, H. F., Mpn of the Old Stone Age, (1915) ; Ripley. W. Z.. 
The Races of Europe, (1899) ; Grant, M., The Passing of the Great Race, 
(1918). 



Political 
theories. 



Separating the east and west, from the south, Slavs, are the Hun- 
garians, (or Magyars), about 10 millions, immediately east of whom 
are the Rumanians, about 12 millions, — about one-third being in 
Austria-Hungary.= 

In 1683, the Polish patriot king, John Sobieski, turned back the 
high tide of Turkish conquest almost from the very gates of Vienna. 
It had then overflowed all the territory of central Europe from the 
Carpathian mountains on the north to the Agean sea on the south, 
and from the Black sea on the east to the Adriatic on the west. 

In 1699, Hungary and Transylvania were acquired by Austria; 
Croatia and Slavonia about 1718; Bohemia, 1741; and Galicia by the 
partition of Poland, 1772-1795; and Dalmatia in 1814. Russia and 
Germany, or rather Prussia, had acquired large parts of Poland, at 
its partition, 1772-1795; and Russia acquired Bessarabia in 1812. 
The territory south of the Danube river and the Transylvanian Alps 
constitutes what is called the Balkan States. They include Rumania, 
Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, Albania, Greece, and Turkey in Europe, 
with nearly 200,000 square miles of territory, and about 25 million 
people,— that is nearly the size and more than one-third the popula- 
tion of Germany. 

A very large proportion of the people in this territory are Slavs, 
or of Slavic descent, or of strong Slavic admixture, closely related 
to the Russians. About 8 millions are Rumanians; 5 millions, Bul- 
garians; 6 millions, Serbs; 5 millions, Greeks; and a little more than 
one million Turks; all, however, except the Turks, have a large 
substratum of the Slavic blood. Nearly 20 millions are Christians, 
more than 18 millions being members of the Eastern or Grecian 
church in some of its branches. In addition to these Slavic peoples 
in the Balkan States, there are in southern Austria-Hungary, (Bosnia, 
Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovania), 5 million more Slavs, (Serbs, 
Croats, and Slovenes), closely akin to the Serbs of Servia; while 
in the north of Austria-Hungary and southern and eastern Germany, 
there are about 21 million more Slavs, (Czechs, Poles, Ruthenians, 
and Slovaks). A large part of these are Catholics.^ For more than 
140 years, since the treaty of 1774, Russia has claimed, and has been 
conceded, to be the special champion of these Christians of the Greek 
church, against the oppression and cruelties of the Turks.^ 

Down nearly to the nineteenth century, the political theory on 
the continent of Europe was that of "Government by Divine Right," 



2. See Stateman's Year Book, 1915, and Encyclopedia Britannica, 11th 
Ed., Europe, with maps ; also may in Hayes, Modern Europe, Vol. 2, pp. 330, 
427. 

3. See Statesman's Year Book, 1915 ; Encyclopedia Britannica. 11th Ed., 
Europe, and the various countries ; and Hayes, C. J. "H., Modern Europe, Vol. 
2, pp. 490-498. 

4. Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji, (1774), Hayes, Modern Europe, Vol. 1, pp. 
38G, 387 ; Historians' History of the World, Vol. 24, p. 419. 



9 

centered in a Feudal Monarch, characterized by "absolute power," 
"divine authority," "hereditary right," and "private, exclusive, pro- 
prietary ownership" in the right to govern. The Kaiser still holds 
to this doctrine."' 

The English revolution, (1688), the American revolution, (1776), Straggle for 
and the French revolution, (1789), were direct and successful chal- ' ^^ ^" 
lenges to such political doctrines. Immediately following the Ameri- 
can and French revolutions, a wave of hope of freedom ran over 
Europe like an electric current; this and the genius and ambition of 
Napoleon threatened and imperiled the absolute monarchies of all 
Europe. In western Europe this cry for freedom demanded liberty 
secured by written constitutions; in the Balkan states it took, in 
addition, the shape of struggles to secure independence from the 
dominion of the Turk. 

The Congress of Vienna, 1814-1815, made up of the one hundred ab- Consrress of 
solute monarchs, kings, and dukes, presided over by Metternich, 
after the downfall of Napoleon, re-arranged the map of Europe, on 
the principle of the status quo mite, and the "balance of power," 
wilfully disregarding all racial and national aspirations, restoring 
the boundaries of the reigning families, using the people as pawns 
for dynastic aggrandizement, and providing for the suppression of 
liberalism. It thereby blocked, but did not quench the hope of 
Liberty." 

For the most part the struggle from 1815 to 1850, resulted in the Constitutions. 
granting of "camouflage" constitutions, by absolute monarchs, giving 
the shadow, but withholding the substance of Liberty, Equality, and 
Fraternity." Montenegro early obtained her independence of Turkey, 
and Greece likewise, in 1830, but the other Balkan states failed until 
1878-1908. 

Bismarck appeared on the scene as Prime Minister of Prussia, in Bismarck. 
1862, announcing that great questions are not decided by votes and 
majorities, but by "blood and iron," and in violation of the Prussian 
constitution and contrary to the will of the majority of the people 
re-organized the Prussian army.* The next year he induced Austria 



.5. In a speech at Koenigsburs In 1910. the Kaiser said : "Here my grand- 
father placed the crown on his head, insisting that it was bestowed upon him 
by the grace of God alone, as the chosen instrument of heaven. I consider 
myself such an instrument of heaven." 

(i. Hayes, Modern Europe, Vol. II, pp. 1-148. 

7. For example: The Prussian Constitution of January 31, 1850, still In 
force, was granted by "Frederick William, (IV). bv the grace of God, King 
of Prussia," etc.; in a suit in Missouri in 1856. (22 Mo. 550), he says he 
"is the absolute monarch of the kingdom of Prussia, and as king thereof is 
the sole government of tliat country ; that he Is unrestrained by any constitu- 
tion or law, and that his will, expressed in due form, is the law of that 
country, and is the only legal power there known to exist as law." The 
Kaiser says : "The supreme law is the will of the king." "That is the nature 
of monarchy ; there Is only one master, and that is I." 

^•., JS''"=^i'' F'. K., Government and PoUiics of the German Empire. (1915), 



10 

to aid Prussia in wresting Sclileswig and Holstein from Denmark, in 
violation of the treaty of 1852, to whicli they were both parties." He 
then quarreled with Austria over the spoils; attacked her; 
defeated her in seven weeks; imposed $15,000,000 war indemnity 
on her; annexed Schleswig and Holstein, and added 30,000 square 
miles of territory and five million of people to Prussia. He then 
kicked Austria out of the old German confederation; formed the 
North German confederation in its stead with Austria left out, drew 
up its constitution over night, and forced the smaller north German 
states into it. This North German Confederation constitution is the 
basis of the present constitution of the German Empire.'" 

In 1870, he secretly induced Russia to break her treaty of 1856 
as to its Black sea clauses, in order to discredit her with the other 
powers." The same year he secretely and vigorously urged the Hohen- 
zollern Prince Leopold, for succession to the Spanish throne, in order 
to stir up Prance, though publicly stoutly denying that the ministry 
had anything to do with it; and by modifying the Ems telegram, he 
deliberately brought on war with France.'- In six months France 
was crushed; $1,000,000,000 indemnity was imposed on her; 5,600 
square miles of Alsace-Lorraine, with 1,600,000 population annexed 
to Prussia; and Potash mines, worth $3,000,000,000 and the greatest iron 
ore beds in Europe, were secured." 
^ot^blee Bismarck then turned again to Austria, who had cooled off some- 

what, from her treatment in the Schleswig-Holstein matter, and 
suggested to her that she recoup herself for her losses, by annexa- 



9. Mowat, R. B., Introduction to Select Treaties, Oxford Pamphlets, No. 
XVIII, (1914-15). 

10. Prussia objected to the extension of the Danish constitution to Schles- 
wig, by the King of Denmark. Bismarck, falsely representing to the Danish 
king that England was about to intervene in his favor, thereby induced him to 
remain defiant ; this gave Bismarck the excuse he wanted to invade Schleswig 
and Holstein. Many years later he said, "fYom the beginning I kept annexa- 
tion constantly in mind." See, Mowat, as above ; Encyc. Brit., 11th Ed., 
Schleswig-Holstein Question : 2 Hayes, Modern Europe, p. 186. 

Hanover, Hesse-Cassel. Nassau, Frankfort, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Saxony 
made the mistake of siding with Austria in this matter, ana so they were 
"annexed" to Prussia, or an indemnity imposed upon them. See, Stevens, F. 
W., Prussia's Territory — Where Bid She Oct Jtf (1917), pp. 4-6. 

11. Bismarck told the British Ambassador at Berlin, at the time that the 
Russian circular, denouncing these clauses, "had taken him ty surprise," but 
years later confessed that he had himself initiated and instigated Russia's 
action.— Pari. Papers, 1871, Cd. 245 ; Bismarck's Reminiscences. Vol. II, 115. 

12. See 2 Hayes, Modern Europe, pp. 198-199 ; Encyc. Brit., 11th Ed.. 
Bismarck; Bismarck was "huffy" because King William, received and talked 
to the French Ambassador, at Ems, concerning the candidature of the Hohen- 
zollern Prince, without referring the matter to him, and had decided to resign. 
He had asked Roon and Moltke to dine with him, and told them his plans. 
They were much depressed. He says : "During our conversation a telcarram 
from Ems was handed to me. * * * i reduced the telegram by striking 
out words. * * * I read the concentrated edition to my guests. * * * 
I went on, 'If I communicate at oi.ce this text to the newspapers * * * it will 
be known in Paris before midnight, and * * * will have the effect of a red 
rag upon a Gallic bull.' Moltke said 'If I may but live to lead our armies In 
such a war, then the devil may come and fetch away the old carcass.' " — Bis- 
marck's Reminiscences. Vol. II, pp. 87-103. 

13. See Stevens, P. W., Prussia's Territory, — Where Did She Get Jtt 
(1917), pp. 7-9. 



11 

tions in the Balkans, then struggling for independence from Turkey. 
The time came in 1875-76, during Christian insurrection in Herze- 
govina and Bulgaria, repressed by such savage barbarity by the 
Turks as made all Europe indignant. The Turks developed unexpected 
strength. Russia came to the rescue. Austria shirked. After enorm- 
ous expense and sacrifice Russia defeated Turkey; the preliminary 
peace terms were not satisfactory to Austria, who claimed that 
Russia's effort alone to make peace with Turkey violated the pro- 
visions of the Protocol of 1871, — entered into by all the powers, at 
Bismarck's suggestion, after the notice of the repudiation of the 
Black sea clauses of the treaty of 1856, by Russia, referred to above, — 
"that no Power * * * can modify treaty provisions, except with the 
consent of the contracting parties by mutual agreement," since Aus- 
tria, Russia, Germany, France, England, and Turkey were parties 
to it. Russia submitted and consented to the calling of the Congress 
of Berlin, in 1878, under the presidency of Bismarck, who, acting 
as an "honest broker," failed to support Russia, as she had a right 
to expect, because of her neutrality in the Franco-Prussian war. 
Rumania, Servia, and Montenegro were made independent of Turkey; 
Bulgaria was not; Montenegro was placed under the tutelage of 
Austria, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, while left under Turkish 
sovereignty, were to be "occupied and administered" by Austria- 
Hungary. In this way Russia was very largely deprived of any 
of the larger advantages of her great sacrifice." England was, perhaps, 
as much to blame for the final results, as was Germany or Aystria. 

The six great powers of Europe were divided into two camps, the 
Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, since 
1882; and the Triple Entente, between Great Britain, France, and 
Russia, since 1904. Their exact terms have never been fully pub- 
lished. In 1879 Austria and Germany formed the Dual Alliance, by 
which they mutually agreed to support one another, if either was 
attacked by Russia, or by some other power aided by Russia, "with 
the whole of the military power of their empire." In 1882, Italy 
became a party to it, and in 1914, claimed it was only for defensive, 
and not aggressive, purposes.^' Sometime between 1891 and 1897 
France and Russia entered into a defensive alliance, such that "the 
relations of Germany with Vienna were no closer than those of France 
with Russia." In 1899, England and Russia came to mutual agree- 
ment concerning their relations with China, and in 1907, settled all 
their difliculties in reference to Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet. 
These, however, related only to their respective spheres of influence, 



14. See, Mowat, Introduction Select Treaties, Oxford Pamphlets, (1914- 
15) ; Encyc. Brit.. 11th Ed., Europe; Berlin, Gorifjress of : 2 Hayes, Modern 
Europe, pp. 498-509. 

15. See Mowat, Select Treaties, Introduction, p. lii, and pp. 20, 23 ; also 
Scott, Diplomatic Docs., Vol. 1, pp. 335, 346. 



12 

and were not defensive alliances. In 1904, Great Britain and France 
had also come to satisfactory agreements as to Egypt, Morocco, New- 
foundland, and Senegambia, and thereby settling all outstanding 
difficulties between them. These constituted "the understandings" 
of, the Triple Entente, which was a "diplomatic group" instead of a 
defensive alliance, except as between France and Russia; it left 
Great Britain "free from engagements." For sometime, also, after 
1905, French and British naval and military experts had, by au- 
thority, consulted together, but it was understood "that such con- 
sultation does not restrict the freedom of either government to decide 
at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force."^" 
in^Balkans^"^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^^ Turkish revolution occurred. Bulgaria declared her 
independence of Turkey. Austria, backed by Germany "in shining 
armor," and in violation of the treaties of 1871, and 1878, to which 
they both were parties, annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. This 
greatly roused Turkey, Russia, and all the Slav states, especially 
Servia, which saw her hopes for access to the Adriatic sea disappear, 
and likewise her desire for economic independence of Austria. She 
appealed to Russia, who protested at Vienna without avail. England, 
also, vigorously protested at the high-handed manner of over-riding 
the provisions of solemn treaties. Great Britain, France, and Russia 
asked for a conference; Germany refused to join, unless Austria con- 
sented, and she refused. Germany then moblized her army against 
Russia, on the Polish frontier, and by a threatening autographic letter 
from the Kaiser, forced her to abandon her request for a conference, 
and assume $9,000,000 of the Turkish debt as compensation for the 
independence of Bulgaria. Russia was so obliged to humiliate her- 
self thus, for she had not yet recovered from the results . of the 
Japanese war." Prince Bulow, then German Chancellor, says: "The 
German sword had been thrown into the scale of the European 
decision, directly in support of our Austro-Hungarian ally, indirectly 
for the preservation of European peace, and above all for the sake 
of German credit, and the maintenance of our position in the world.^* 

Bitter feeling All this resulted in the creation in Russia and in the Balkan states 
resulting. 

generally, especially among the Slavic population, intensely bitter 

feelings, and for many years the organization of secret societies and 
extensive propaganda have taken place looking toward the establish- 
ment of greater Slavic states. This has been particularly pronounced 
in Servia, struggling for a "Greater Servia," with nationalist am- 
bitions incompatible with Austrian sovereignty over Bosnia and Her- 



16. Mowat, Select Treaties, Introduction, pp. liii-lxi. and pp. 1-18 ; Col- 
lected Diplomatic Documents, pp. 79-82. 101 ; Scott. Diplomatic Does., pp. 
623. 967-969, (Eng. White Paper, 10.5; French Yellow Paper, 74). 

17. Mowat, Select Treatiei^. pp. 78-87 : Chitwood, O. P., The Immediate 
Causes of the Great War. (1917). op. 22-25. 

18. Imperial Germain/, pp. 51-52. 



13 

zegovina, and other parts of the "Dual Monarchy," inhabited by 
Slavic peoples. Austria-Hungary was looked upon as a second Turkey, 
"where the groans and tears of the Servian brother are heard, and 
where the gallows has its home." "The enemy is insatiable in his 
lusts; he holds millions of our brothers in slavery apd chains. He 
took law and freedom from them, and subjected them all to his ser- 
vice. The brothers murmur and beg for still quicker help. We must 
not leave them to the mercy of this fearful and greedy enemy. We 
must hurry to their help." "We have dismembered the Turkish em- 
pire, we will dismember Austria too."" These were unofficial state- 
ments in newspapers and speeches, made after the declaration of 
1909, whei-eby the Servian Government promised to renounce her 
attitude of protest to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
thereafter live on good neighborly terms with Austria.^" 

MUKDER OF TKE AECHDtTKE. 

June 28, 1914, Franz Ferdinand, Archduke, Crown Prince, and Took place 
iieir to the Austrian throne, and his wife, were murdered at ^" Austria, 
at Serajevo, the capital of Bosnia, one of the Austrian provinces an- 
nexed in 190S, about fifty miles from the Servian frontier, by two 
Bosniaks, both Austrian subjects, one of whom, when in Servia, had By Austrian 
been considered dangerous, and Servia had tried to expel him, but ^"^J^^te. 
was prevented by Austria claiming he was harmless."^ The Austrian Charged 
papers immediately charged that the murder was due to a Servian con- ^^^^^st Sema. 
spiracy." The Servian Royal family and the Government immediately 
sent messages of condolence, and canceled festivities to take place in 
Belgrade on that day." Two days later the Servian minister at Vienna, 
informed Austria that the Servian government was "prepared to sub- 
mit to trial any persons implicated in the plot, in the event of its 
being proved that there are any in Servia.""* The Austrian papers, 
controlled by the Government, constantly charged that the Servian 
people rejoiced over the murder, especially at Belgrade, Nish, and 
Uskub, as an act of revenge for the annexation, and as a step looking 
to the detachment of territory from Austria.^^ Servian officials how- 



19. These are sample quotations. The first and last are from Servian News- 
papers, of 1912-13 ; the middle one is from a speech of the President, (a 
major in the Servian army), of the "Sokol Society," in January, 1914. Col- 
lected Diplomatic Docs., pp. 474, 475, 481 ; Austrian Red Book, Appendix 
1, 3. 

20. Collected Diplomatic Docs., p. 3, Brit. Dip. Cor.. No. 4. 

21. Col. Dip. Docs., pp. 27, 373 ; Brit. Dip. Cor. No. 27 ; Serv. Blue Book, 
No. 8. 

22. Col. Dip Docs., pp. 372, 374, 376, 378, 384 ; Serv. Blue Book, Nos. 8, 12, 
16, 17, 30. 

23. Col. Dip. Docs., p. 384 ; Serv. Blue Book. No. 30. Austria claims 
festivities were not stopped for more than 5 hours, ARB. 448. 

24. CDD, p. 371 ; SBB, No. 5. (Hereafter CDD=CoI. Dip. Docs., and 
SBB=Serv. Blue Book. 

25. CDD. pp. 448, 449, 450; Austrian Red Book, (ARB.), Nos. 1, 3. 5, 6. 



14 

ever, claimed that "the Serajevo outrage has beeu most severely con- 
demned in all circles of society, inasmuch as all, official as well as 
unofficial, immediately recognized that this outrage would be most 
prejudical not only to our good neighborly relations to Austria-Hun- 
gary, but also to our co-nationalists in that country," and that "it 
was of the greatest interest to Servia to prevent the perpetration 
of this outrage. Unfortunately this did not lie within Servia's power, 
as both assassins are Austrian subjects."-*' 

INVESTIGATION BY AUSTRIA. 

Results not A secret ministerial investigation was made by the Austrian Dis- 

^" ^ ^ ■ trict court, in the prison at Serajevo; this lasted for nearly a month; 
Servia was not notified and was not asked to participate.^' Almost 
nothing was said officially during this time; the results of the find- 
ings were not published. There was little popular clamor at the time, 
although the Austrian papers persistently charged the Servian gov- 
ernment with complicity, at least by sufferance, in the murder; the 
German and English newspapers repeated these statements from the 
Austrian papers; to all these the Servian papers made bitter denials 
and counter-charges.'-' 

KNOWLEDGE OF DIPLOMATS. 

Germany Aside from German officials, none of the European diplomats had 

alone knew. 

any direct or definite knowledge of the results of the findings at the 

investigation, or the probable acts or claims of Austria. She studi- 
ously withheld these from the representatives of all the powers, in- 



26. CDD. p. 372 ; SBB. No. S. 

Note. — The murder of the Archduke. The Archduke was a man of strong 
and independent will, greatly loved by the army, but almost hated by the 
Bosnians. His political views did not accord with those of the Austrian and 
German Emperors, whose policy was to dominate and repress the political 
aspirations of the Slav population of the Austrian Empire. The Archduke's 
hope was to appease these people, and erect them into a Slavic state, reaching 
to the Black Sea, making the dual monarchy a triple monarchy, each state 
having an independent status of its own but bound to the Monarchy, through 
the Emperor, in all affairs and interests it had in common with the others. 
This would have blocked the Servian hopes of a Greater Servia, and also the 
Kaiser's "Mittel-Europa" plans. The Kaiser and the Archduke were not 
friends; in fact detested one another; their last interview, a few days before 
the murder, was most stormy. The Archduke strongly objected to the pro- 
gramme of greatly increased military preparations, urged by the Kaiser, and 
the Hungarians, to be used for subjecting the Servians by force. The Kaiser 
immediately telegraphed Budapest of the Archduke's refusal to approve. That 
there was a plot to murder the Archduke, at his proposed visit to Sarajevo, 
was known at Vienna, Budapest, and Belgrade. Servia warned Austria of this, 
yet the Archduke was not informed, nor was any effort made to dissuade him 
from making the visit, nor were any effective steps taken to protect him. — 
Davenport, History of the Great War, (1916). pp. 82-87. 

27. CDD. pp. 371, 377, 381, 385 ; SBB. Nos. 5, 16, 23, 30. British and 
German Ideals, reprinted from Round Table. 1914, 1915, p. 107. 

28. CDD. pp. 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 376, 378, 379, 380, 382, 38.3, 384; 
FYB, No. 14; SBB, Nos. 1. 2. 3, 4. 7. 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 
22, 24, 27, 29, 30. 



15 

eluding her ally, -Italy,— except Germany.^" It was generally assumed 
that if the investigation showed Servian complicity, demands of some 
sort would be made on the Servian government, by Austria, but it 
was semi-officially stated that her claims would be moderate, and 
would "contain nothing with which a self-respecting State need 
hesitate to comply. "=" 

THE GREATER TRAGEDY. 

The murder of the Archduke and his wife was a tragedy, but in itself 
was not different from such as have occurred before. Its awful signifi- 
cance is in furnishing the occasion and pretext of that infinitely 
greater tragedy, that for the past four years has drenched the world 
in blood. 

It is my purpose to examine the responsibility for this calamity, — 
mainly from the records of the Diplomatic Correspondence immediate- 
ly preceding the commencement of the war. At the end, I will refer 
briefly to some matters that are not in the official records, but are 
fully established otherwise. 

THE RECORDS. 

These include the various official publications of the respective Full records 
governments, of parts or all of the diplomatic correspondence, con- between 
tained in the popularly called colored books or papers: The British Q^^any!^^ 
Blue Books, (BBB) (1) and (2), 342 pages, and 371 documents; the 
French Yellow Book, (FYB), 237 pages, 185 documents; Russian 
Orange Books, (ROB), (1) and (2), 107 pages, 177 documents; 
Belgian Grey Books, (BGB), (1) and (2), 182 pages, 198 documents; 
Serbian Blue Book, (SBB), 50 pages, 53 documents; Italian Green 
Book, (IGB), 120 pages, 73 documents; German White Book, (GWB), 
90 pages, 43 documents; and Austrian Red Books, (ARB), (1) and 
(2), 344 pages, and 274 documents. With two exceptions, these 
documents give in detail what passed between the Capitals of Europe 
during these days. The two exceptions are: the communications 
made by Austria to Germany, Vienna to Berlin, and the reverse. The 
documents show that much communication took place between these 
capitals, but almost nothing of it is published in either the German 
White Book, or the Austrian Red Books. The terms of these com- 
munications have been withheld, and are conspicuous by their ab- 
sence." 



29. CDD. pp. 30. 114. 1.58, 165, 176, 396; Brit. Blue Book (BBB.). Nos. 
38, 161: French Yellow Book (FYB), Nos. 26, 27. 35, 50; SBB. No. 52. 

30. CDD. pp. 115, 152. 395, 396 ; BBB. No. 161 ; FYB. No. 20 ; SBB. No. 
52. 

31. There are three principal collections of these documents : Collected 
Diplomatic Documents, (CDD), London. 1915, p. 561. This does not include 
BBB (2), BGB (2), ROB (2), nor ARB (2). BBB (2) contains correspond- 



16 



DELn-ERY OF THE X^LTIMATUM. 



Reply 

demanded in 
48 hours. 



Diplomats on 
vacations. 



At 6 p. m., Thursday, July 23, 1914, the Austrian Minister at Bel- 
grade, handed a Note"- to the Acting Prime Minister of Servia, to be 
answered within 48 hours, that is, by 6 p. m., Saturday, and added 
that "he and his staff would leave Belgrade unless a favorable answer 
were forthcoming within the stipulated time."^" The Servian 
Ministers were absent from Belgrade, at the time; the President of 
France and the President of the Council and Prime Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, were known to be at sea on their way home from 
St. Petersburg which they had left the same night; the German 
Emperor was in Scandinavia; and the Prussian Ambassador at 
Vienna had left a few days before, on the assurance of Austria "that 
the demands on Servia would be thoroughly acceptable." The Italian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs was also away from Rome."* The Austrian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs left Vienna on July 25, (the day Servia's 
reply was due) to go to Ischl, six hours away." 



ClIAKGES IX THE ULTIMAXr.M. 



Subversive This ultimatum alleged the existence in Servia of a "subversive 
^alnS^Servia movement," born under "the eye of the Servian government," with 
alleged. 

31. Con. 

ence between England and Turkey; BGB (2). between England and Belgium; 
ROB (2), between Russia and Turkey; ARB (2), between Austria and Turkey. 
Scott, J. B., Diplomatic Documents. (SDD), Parts 1 and 2, 1916. The Times 
(London) Documentary History of the War, Vols. 1 and 2, Diplomatic, (TDD), 
1917. These documents are, in the main, arranged chronologically by coun- 
tries, and are given a number by which they are cited. These numbers do 
not exactly correspond, in a few cases, in the different collections. The CDD 
were the first to 1>e published, are official, and are the basis of all the others ; 
they were published as "British White Papers, (BPW). Miscellaneous." The 
BBB (1), Miscl. Nos. 6, 8. 10, Sept.. 1914; FYB, Miscl. No. 15, Dec, 1914; 
BGB (1), ROB (1), ARB (1). SBB, — all Miscl., Oct.. 1914. These and 
GWB (1) were gathered together and published as CDD in one volume in 
191.5. The GWB (1) was laid before the Imperial Diet, August .3, 1914, and 
published very soon thereafter by the Imperial Foreign Office, with the "only 
authorized translation" into English, "by Liebheit and Thiesen," Berlin ; the 
second GWB was published by authority early in 1915, with an authorized 
translation into English ; all of GWB (1) is reprinted, but the new authorized 
translation diflCers somewhat from the "only authorized" one first published. 
BBB is often cited as BWP, (British White Paper), or BDC, (British Diplo- 
matic Correspondence), or EWB, or EWP, that is. English White Paper or 
Book, or just E. The others are also cited quite often as "Papers," as PYP. 
or BGP, etc. The TDD cites them : B=BBB ; G^BGB ; O^ROB ; R= 
ARB ; S<=SBB ; W=GWB ; Y=FYB. The TDD. seem to have much the 
best index and cross-references. Both SDD, and TDD have very helpful tables 
of contents of the separate "books," giving number, date, parties and con- 
tents of each document, chronologically, and page where found. 

32. On July 23, the Austrian Ambassador at London told Earl Grey that 
the Note, (which he would deliver the next day), "would be something in 
the nature of a time limit, which was in effect akin to an ultimatum." The 
next day Austria insisted that it was a "demarche with a time limit." It 
was treated by all as an "ultimatum." CDD, pp. 2, 14, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 
157. 159, 424. 

83. CDD, p. 388 ; 2 SDD, 1469 ; SBB, No. 33. 

34. CDD, p. 388 ; 2 SDD, p. 1469 ; SBB, No. 33 ; CDD. p. 266 ; 2 SDD, p. 
1331 ; ROB. No. 1 ; CDD, pp. 15, 154. 161. 165, 169. 171. 176 ; 2 SDD. pp. 
880 ; 1 SDD, pp. 568, 582, 592. 594, 595, 604 ; BBB, No. 6 ; FYB, Nos. 22, 29, 
41, 44, 45, 50, 51. 

35. CDD, p. 23 ; 2 SDD, 893 ; BBB, No. 20. 



17 

the object of detaching territory from Austria; that Servia had done 
nothing to repress it; had permitted criminal nfachinations of vari- 
ous societies; tolerated and glorified their perpetrators in the public 
press; and allowed officials to participate therein, contrary to her 
promise of 1909. ■'' 

DEMANDS OF THE ULTIMATUM. 

Austria demanded that Servia publish in her Official Gazette on Humiliating 
Sunday, July 26, 1914, and as an order of the day to the Servian * ^^^^^ ^' 
army, and in the Army Bulletin, a declaration, prepared by Austria, 
substantially as follows:'" 

That Servia condemns all such propaganda; regrets that Servian 
officers have participated therein; and hinds herself to — 

1. Suppress every publication inciting hatred of Austria; 

2. Dissolve all secret societies engaging in, and confiscate 

their means of, such propaganda; 

3. Eliminate all such from public instruction; 

4. Remove all officers guilty, whose names Austria reserves 

the right to communicate to Servia; 

5. "Accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of the interfere with 

Austro-Hungarian Government for the suppression of the ^" 



Servian 
sovereignty. 
subversive movement directed against the territorial integ- 



rity of the Monarchy"; (in GWB, this reads: "Consent that 
in Servia officials of the Imperial and Royal Government 
co-operate in the suppression of a movement directed 
against the territorial integrity of the monarch") ; 

"Take judicial proceedings against accessories to the plot 
of the 28th June who are on Servian territory; the dele- 
gates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part 
in the investigation relating thereto"; (in GWB, this 
reads: "Commence a judicial investigation against the 
participants of the conspiracy of June 28th, who are on 
Servian territory. Officials, delegated by the Imperial and 
Royal Government, will participate in the examina- 
tions") ; 

Arrest Major Tankosic, and Milan Ciganowic, officials, alleg- 
ed to be implicated in the crime; 

Prevent the smuggling of arms and explosives across the 
Austro-Servian frontier; 

Dismiss guilty army and civil officials; 



36. CDD, pp. 3, 415 ; 2 SDD, 8G6, 781 ; BBB, No. 4 ; ARB, No. 7 ; FYB, No. 
24 : ROB. No. 2 ; SBB, No. 31 ; GWB. "Original Telearams, etc." 

37. CDD, pp. 3-8 ; 414-410 ; 2 SDD, 781 ; 2 SDD, 80G ; BBB, No. 4 ; GWB. 
Telcf/rams. 



18 



10. Explain alleged interviews by Servian officials, hostile to 

Austria. 

11. Notify Austria without delay of the execution of the fore- 
going ; 

12. Reply at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25tli 

July. 

ME5I0RAXDUM ANNEXED. 

There was a memorandum annexed to this ultimatum stating that 
the Austrian investigation at Serajevo showed:"* 

That the murder was planned in Belgrade by Princip, Ga- 
brinowic, Ciganowic, and Grabez, with the aid of Tankosic; 
that the six bombs and four pistols used, were obtained by 
Tankosic and Ciganowic, at the arsenal at Belgrade; that 
Ciganowic gave instruction in their use in a forest near there 
to Princip, Gabrinowic, and Grabez; that Ciganowic originated 
a secret system of transportation, by which, with the help of a 
Servian frontier captain and a custom officer, an entry into 
Bosnia was effected. 
No part of the evidence was then submitted or tendered to Serbia. 
The ultimatum is supposed to have been prepared under the general 
direction of Count Tisza, President of the Ministry of Hungary, by 
Count Forgach, former Austrian Minister to Servia, then Under Secre- 
tary of State for Foreign Affairs; he had been in 1908-9 notoriously 
connected with the forged papers, on which charges of Servian con- 
spiracies had been based in the Agram and Friedjung trials in 1909- 
10.=^ 



SURPRISE AT THE CHARACTER OF THE ULTIMATUJI. 

The substance if not the complete text of the note, treated as an 
ultimatum, was immediately published in the European newspapers, 
before official copies were received by the Great Powers, other than 
Germany.*" It will be noted that it assumed guilty knowledge, active 
participation, and criminal complicity in the propaganda and crime 
charged, by the Servian Officials, and demanded immediate investiga- 
tion and suppression, removal of officials named by Austria, and 
supervision and participation by Austrian officials in such investiga- 
tion and suppression, in a way inconsistent with the laws and 



38. CDD, pp. 12-13 ; 416-417 ; 2 SDD, 784. 877 : BBB, No. 4. 

39. British and German Ideals, (The Round Table, Sept., 1914, March, 
191.5). p. 107; The Britannica Year-Book, 1913, p. 961. CDD, 396; 2 SDD, 
1482 : SBB, No. 52 ; FYB, No. 30. 

40. CDD. 1.5.5. 158, 150. 161, 268, 396. 456; 1 SDD. 569, 579, 582: 2 SDD, 
1338. 1482; FYB, Nos. 23, 27, 29, 29, 30; ROB, No. 7; ABB, No. 11; SBB, 
No. 52. 



ID 

sovereignty of Servia." Sir Edward Grey said lie "liad never before 
seen one state address to anotlier independent state a document of 
so formidable a character."'- Russian and French officials agreed 
that it was quite impossible for any independent state, however small, 
to accept,*' and Servia "would no longer be master in her own house" 
if she did." The German Secretary of State admitted she "could not 
swallow certain of the demands,"*' and all the representatives of the 
Great Powers at Vienna, except the German, were surprised and 
dumbfounded at its contents.*' 

GERMANY'S CLAIJI. 

Diplomatic correspondence among the other powers immediately 
began,— before Servia replied. And inasmuch as Germany made the 
first move, it is proper to state Germany's claims first, and then ex- 
amine them in the light of the actual records. Germany has from 
the first claimed, and yet claims: 

1. The war is a defensive one on her part. In a speech from the Defensive war. 
balcony of the Royal Palace in Berlin, July 31, 1914, the Kaiser said: 

"Envious nations on all sides are forcing us to a justifiable 
defense. They are forcing the sword into my hands."*' 
And in his speech, at the opening of the Reichstag, August 4, 1914, 
he said: 

"In a war that has been forced upon us, with a clear con- 
science, and a clean hand we take up the sword."*^ 

2. Russia was responsible: The sub-title of the German White Russia 
Book is: "How Russia and her ruler betrayed Germany's confidence, ^'^•^p°'^''^ 
and thereby made the European war." 

3. She, Germany, did not know, and had nothing to do with, the Germany not 

^ . accessorv. 

contents of Austria's ultimatum to Servia. 

GEKilAXY'S KNOWLEDGE. 

Throughout the negotiations German officials constantly told the 9''™'^(^^'j„ 
Russian, English, and French officials that "They had not known be- knowledge, 
forehand," were "entirely ignorant" of, and "exercised no influence 
on" the contents of the ultimatum, and there was "no concert," or 



41. ODD. 13, 157, 2()S. 27;", 458 : 1 SDD. 57S : 2 SDD, 879, 1337, 1350 ; 
BBB, No. 5 ; FYB, Ko. 20 ; KOB. No. 6, 25 ; ARB, No. 14 ; CDD, 39 ; 2 
SDD, 915 : BBB. No. 44. 

42. CDD, 13, 1G5 ; 1 SDD, 586 ; 2 SDD, 879 : BBB, No. 5 ; FYB, No. 34. 

43. CDD, 1G4, 281 ; 1 SDD,-o86 ; 2 SDD, 1358 ; FYB, No. 33 ; ROB, No. 41. 

44. CDD, 458; 1 SDD, 24; ARB, No. 14. 

45. CDD, 23 ; 2 SDD. 891 ; BBB, No. 18. 

46. CDD, 158, 174, 39G ; 1 SDD, 579, 602 ; 2 SDD, 1482 ; FYB. Nos. 158, 
174 : SBB, No. 52. 

47. (iauss. German Kmperor as slioicn in his Public Acts, (Scribuer, 1915), 
p. 323. 

4S. lb., p. 324. 



20 



Yet gave 
Austria free 
hand. 



"definite understanding" between Germany and Austria as to it."^* 
This was false, and after the war was begun the Foreign office ad- 
mitted that Austria asked Germany for her opinion, and she an- 
swered: "We were able to agree with" Austria's estimate of the situa- 
tion, and assure her "that any action considered necessary," by her 
"would meet with our approval," and we gave her "a completely free 
hand in her action against Servia." "We were perfectly aware that 
a possible warlike attitude" of Austria "against Servia might bring 
Russia in," and "involve us in war, in accordance with our duties as 
allies."'" The time and extent of Germany's knowledge of the ulti- 
matum, and the part she had in it will be discussed later on. 



NEGOTIATIONS. 



Germany 

forbids 

intervention. 



Thursday, July 23, 1914. 

As indicated above, Germany made the first move. This was in the 
evening of the day the ultimatum was sent by Austria to Servia, 
July 23, and itself indicated Germany had prior knowledge of its 
contents. It was a communication sent by Germany to England, 
France, and Russia, and stated that "the action as tcell as the de- 
mands." of Austria, are "absolutely justifiable." "It is to be feared 
that the Servian Government will decline to meet these demands." 
There would then be nothing left to Austria "but to press their de- 
mands," "and, if need be, enforce the same by appeal to military 
measures, in regard to which the choice of means must be left with 
Austria." "We earnestly desire the localization of the conflict be- 
cause any intervention of another Power, owing to the various treaty- 
alliances, would entail inconceivable consequences."^^ In other words, 
Austria must have a free hand to crush Servia, and any intervention 
by any other power meant European war. 



Friday, July 24, 1914. 



Ultimatum The ultimatum reached England, France, Belgium, and Russia, 

meant war. 

about 10 o'clock, — one-third of the time limit already having passed." 



49. CDD, pp. 14, 23, 25, 149. 161. 166, 169, 181, 196, 272. 273 ; 2 SDD, 
S80, 896; 1 SDD, 562, 563, 582, 588, 592, 609, 640; 2 SDD, 1346, 1347; 
BBB, Nos. 6, 18, 25 ; FYB, Nos. 15. 17, 30, 36, 41, 57, 78 ; ROB. 18, 19, 20. 

50. CDD, 406 ; 2 SDD, 771 ; GWB, Statement of Foreign Office, Aug. 3, 
1914. 

51. CDD, pp. 16, 159, 267. 424; 1 SDD, 579; 2 SDD, 798, 883, 1335; 
BBB, No. 9; FYB, No. 28; ROB. No. 3; GWB. Ex. 1. On July 21. the 
German Secretary of State Insisted that the "question at issue was one for 
settlement between Servia and Austria alone, and that there should be no 
interference from outside In the discussions between these two countries." 
BBB, No. 2. The German Secretary of State told French Ambassador at 
Berlin "the note was forcible, and he approved it" ; "the question was a 
domestic one for Austria, and he hopes it will be localized." 

52. CDD, pp. 2, 13. 155, 267, 300; 2 SDD, 864. 879; 1 SDD, 576: 2 
SDD, 1335 ; 1 SDD, 300 ; BBB, Nos. 3. 5 ; FYB, No. 25 ; BGB, No. 1 ; ROB, 
No. 3. 



The English, French, Russian and German ofRcials all considered that 
it "meant war"; indeed that it was so "drawn as to make war in- 
evitable"; that Austria was determined to "inflict humiliation on 
Servia," and would "accept no intervention until the blow had been 
delivered and received full in the face by Servia."" 

Servia immediately appealed to Russia.-'* Russia immediately de- RuRsia 
clared she "could not remain indifferent," and "could not allow Aus- 
tria to crush Servia," and the question was not "merely between 
Servia and Austria, but a European" one.'" 

Russia urged France and England to stand with her; France agreed 
to support her in negotiations and as an ally "if necessity arose"; 
England refused to make such an agreement. '' 

Austria explained to Russia that she desired Servia "publicly to Austria 
disavow the tendencies directed against" Austria, "suppress them conquest of 
by administrative measures" and "make it possible to satisfy" her- Servia not 
self "that these were honestly carried out"; that she "did not aim at 
any increase of territory," "entertained no thought of conquest," 
"would not claim Servian territory" and did not "intend to * * * change 
the balance of powers in Balkans."' At the same time she also 
explained "in strict confidence" to England, that if a satisfactory 
reply was not received within the time limit, she would break off But de- 
diplomatic relations with Servia, begin military preparations, and u'se'force if 
was "absolutely resolved to carry through" her "just demands."'* necessary. 

Russia and England immediately made separate and joint requests, Extension of 
directly and indirectly through Germany, to Austria, for an extension p™]y "^^ 
of time for the Servian reply, to enable the powers to study the de- requested, 
mands of Austria, advise Servia, and "smooth away the difRculties 
that have arisen."''' 

Germany answered that she "passed on" this request to Austria, Request 
but that the Foreign Minister was not at home; that It was probably by Germany, 
"too late" to get "the time limit extended"; that Austria "wished to 
give the Servians a lesson and meant to take military action;" and 
that Servia "could not swallow certain of the demands.""" There is 
no record or indication that Germany made or joined in any request 



53. CDD, pp. 38, 23. 37, 171 ; 2 SDD, SOI, 912. 913 ; 1 SDD, 595 ; BBB, 
Nos. 18, 40. 41 ; FYB, No. 45. 

54. CDD, pp. 2G7, 389 ; 2 SDD. 1337. 1470 ; ROB. No. fi ; SBB, No. 37. 

55. CDD. pp. 22, 163, 209. 3S9. 407, 427, 459 : 2 SDD. 890 : 1 SDD, 
584; 2 SDD, 1339, 1470; 2 SDD. 774. 802, 26; BBB, No. 17; FYB, No. 
31 ; ROB, No. 10 ; SBB, No. 36 ; GWB. Tel., etc., Ex. 4 ; ARB, No. 15. 

56. CDD, p. 14 : 2 SDD, 880 ; BP.B, No. 0. 

57. CDD. pp. 460, 426, 15 ; 1 SDD, 28 ; 2 SDD, 801, 882 ; ARB, No. IS ; 
GWB, Ex. 3; BBB, No. 7. 

58. CDD, p. 460; 1 SDD. 27 ; -^RB, No. 17. 

59. CDD. pp. 18, 19, 126, 167, 171. 499; 2 SDD, 885, 887. 897; 1 SDD, 
590. 595, 75 ; BBB. Nos. 11. 13, 26 : FYB, Nos. 38. 45 : ARB. Nos. 20, 21. 

60. CDD, pp. 22, 170 ; 2 SDD, 891 ; 1 SDD, 593 ; BBB, No. 18 ; FYB, 
No. 43. 



to Austria to extend the time. Austria, the next day, denied the 
request for any extension of time.''^ 



Servia urged 
to be 
conciliatory. 

Russia offers 
to stand 
aside. 



Powers 
request 
frontiers be 
not crossed. 



Germany 
refuses to 
join. 



Austria and 
Germany 
understood 
war probable. 



Saturday, July 25, 1914. 

England, France, and Russia, all urged Servia to give as concil- 
iatory answer as possible.''- 

Russia suggested to Servia that she appeal to the powers to help 
her; and if she did so, "Russia would be quite ready to stand aside 
and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany 
and Italy.""" 

England proposed the "four powers, — England, France, Germany 
and Italy, — join in asking the Austrian and Russian governments not 
to cross the Servian frontier, and give time for the four powers acting 
at Vienna and St. Petersburgh to try to arrange matters,'"'^ but "un- 
less Germany would propose and participate in such action at Vienna" 
it would be futile."' "No intervention would be tolerated by either 
Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial, and included the 
allies or friends of both. The co-operation of Germany would, there- 
fore, be essential."'"' 

Germany refused: "the matter was a domestic one for Austria"; 
"all these demarches were too late"; Germany "supports the claims" 
of Austria against Servia "as justified," and "could only be guided 
by her duties as an ally" of Austria; "this question must be local- 
ized by virtue of all the powers refraining from intervention"; but 
said "we are prepared in the event of an Austro-Russia controversy, 
quite apart from our known duties as allies, to intercede between 
Russia and Austria jointly with the other powers."" It is difficult 
to understand what this last suggestion means, since she was being 
asked to intercede because the acts and demands of Austria, had from 
the first created a controversy with Russia. 

July 23, the Austrian ambassador at London had told Sir Edward 
Grey, "that all would depend on Russia"; and on July 25 the Austrian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs told his ambassador at St. Petersburg: 
"We were, of course aware, when we decided to take serious measures 
against Servia, of the possibility that the Servian dispute might 
develop into a collision with Russia" and assumed that he had al- 
ready "established a close understanding with" the German ambassa- 
dor at St. Petersburg, "who will certainly have been enjoined by 



270; 1 SDD, 75; 2 SDD, 1340; ARB. Nos. 20. 21 
Nos. 12, 15, 16. 17. 



Gl. CDD. pp. 
ROB, Nos. 11, 12. 

62. CDD, pp. 19, 21; 2 SDD, SS6, SS9, 890; BB 

63. CDD, pp. 21, 22; 2 SDD, 890; BBB, No. 17. 

64. CDD, p. 25 ; 2 SDD, 895. 896 ; BBB, Nos. 24, 25. 

65. CDD, pp. 17, 18: 2 SDD, 884, 885; BBB, Nos. 10, 11. 

66. CDD, pp. 25. 274 ; 2 SDD, 895, 1349 ; BBB, No. 24 ; ROB. No. 22. 

67. CDD. pp. 167. 169. 170. 272. 273, 429 ; 1 SDD, 588, 589. 592. 593 ; 
2 SDD, 1347. 806 ; FYB, Nos. 36. 37, 41, 43 ; ROB, Nos. 18, 19 ; GWB, Ex. 
13, (Scott. No. 15). 



his government to leave the Russian government no room for doubt 
that Austria in the event of a conflict with Russia would not stand 
alone." Austria was therefore at this time certain that Germany 
had already instructed her ambassador at St. Petersburg to let it be 
known that she would stand by Austria."* 

The German chancellor said later "We were perfectly aware that 
a possible warlike attitude of Austria against Servia, might bring 
Russia upon the field, and might therefore involve us in a war, in 
accordance with our duties as allies. '"'^ 

Yet under these circumstances the Austrian Minister for Foreign Pretended 
Affairs telegraphed his ambassadors at St. Petersburg, London, Paris, Ruee™s^'^ 
and Rome, that he had. just handed to the German ambassador at interest. 
Vienna the statement that Austria "cannot conceal their astonish- 
ment that their action against Servia was directed against Russia 
and Russian influence in the Balkans.'^" 

Russia's views as expressed to the British Ambassador at St. Peters- Russia's 
burg were: "Austria's action was in reality directed against Russia, posit'on- 
She aimed at overthrowing the present status quo in the Balkans, 
and establishing her own hegemony there. He (the Russian Minister 
for Foreign Affairs), did not believe Germany really wanted war, 
but her attitude was decided by" England's. If England took a "stand 
firmly with France and Russia, there would be no war." If England 
"failed them now, rivers of blood would flow," and she "would in the 
end be dragged into war." 

The British Ambassador replied "that England could play the role England not 
of mediator at Berlin and Vienna to better purpose as friend who, aUiance.^ 
if her counsels of moderation were disregarded, might one day be 
converted into an ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia's 
ally at once. His Excellency said that unfortunately Germany was 
convinced that she could count on" England's neutrality. 

The British Ambassador also said all he "could to impress pru- 
dence on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if) 
Russia mobilized, Germany would not be content with mere mobiliza- 
tion, or give Russia time to carry out hers, but would probably de- 
clare war at once. His Excellency replied that Russia coulfl not 
allow Austria to crush Servia and become the predominant power in 
the Balkans, and, if she feels secure of the support of France, she 
will face all the risks of war. He assured me once more that he 
did not wish to precipitate a conflict, but that unless Germany could 
restrain Austria I could regard the situation as desperate."" 

6S. CDD, pp. 3, 501 ; 2 SDD, S04 : 1 SDD, 81 ; BBB. No. 3 ; ARE, No. 
26. 

69. CDD, p. 406 ; 2 SDD. 771 : GWB. No. 1. 

70. CDD, p. 521; 1 SDD. 100: ARB. No. 44. 

71. CDD. pp. 21. 22 ; 2 SDD, 890 ; BBB, No. 17. 



24 



Servia agrees 
to nearly 
everything. 



Austria's 
demand to 
supervise. 



Reply 

declared un- 
satisfactory. 



Austria's 
objections. 



SERVIAN REPLY. 

Servia put in her reply to Austria at 5:45 p. m. It was conciliatory 
in the extreme;"- it granted everything possible; w^hile it did not 
admit official complicity in the propaganda and crimes charged, it 
promised immediate investigation and punishment of any found guilty, 
and removal of any such from office; it promised immediate dis- 
solution and suppression of the alleged offending societies, although 
there w^as no proof submitted of their guilt; it promised so to amend 
the constitution and laws, by the legislative bodies then about to meet, 
that the means of propaganda by such societies and newspapers could 
be confiscated, as requested; it promised to suppress such propaganda in 
all public instruction; and while it was not clear as to exactly what was 
meant by the demand that Austrian officials should be permitted to par- 
ticipate in the investigations and measures of suppression, Servia 
would do all that her own laws, the rules of international law, and good 
neighborly acts would permit or require; Tankosic had already been 
arrested; a warrant had been issued for Ciganowic, but he had not 
yet been found; with these modifications it promised to make the 
publications in the official bulletins as requested, and if any of the 
matters were not satisfactorily answered, it proposed that they be 
submitted to the Hague Peace Tribunal, or to a conference of the 
Powers." 

The Austrian Ambassador at Belgrade scarcely stopped to read the 
reply. He declared it unsatisfactory, and within three quarters of an 
hour left Belgrade with the whole diplomatic outfit.'^ 

Austria could make very little objection to its tone or contents, but 
declared it a sham and insincere, and later (July 25) sent to the 
other powers copies of the reply with her annotations and objections 
to each article of the reply, and a dossier, containing extensive quota- 
tions from alleged confessions, affidavits, and evidence obtained in the 
investigation made at Serajevo, to support her original charges, but 
which she had not furnished to Servia." She claimed that since 
peaceable means "were exhausted," she must "at last appeal to force," 
"in a fight that was forced" on her, "as a matter of self-defense," and 
"the Servians had refused the one thing — the co-operation of Austrian 



72. Grey said it "went farther than could have been expected," "involved 
the greatest humiliation to Servia" that he "had ever seen a country under- 
go," and if Austria did not accept it but "marched into Servia it meant that 
she was determined to crush Servia at all costs." CDD, pp. 41. 4.3. 281 ; 
2 SDD, 916, 918, 1.3.59 ; BBB, Nos. 40, 48 ; ROB, No. 42. Russia thought 
"it exceeded all our expectations in its moderation," and could not see how 
Austria could ask more "unless the Vienna Cabinet is seeking for a pretext 
for a war with Servia." CDD, 278 ; 2 SDD, 13.5.5 ; ROB, No. 3.5. 

73. CDD, pp. 31, .390, 417, 501; 2 SDD. 904. 1477. 785; BBB. No. 39; 
SBB, No. 41 ; GWB, Tel., etc. : ARB, Nos. 34. 24. 

74. CDD. pp. 24, 390, 391, 273. 279 ; 2 SDD, 895, 1476, 1477. 1348, 1356 ; 
BBB, No. 23 ; SBB, Nos. 40, 41, 42 ; ROB, Nos. 21, 37. 

75. CDD, pp. 193. 197, 461: 1 SDD. 29. 637. 641: FYB. Nos. 75 (2), 
80 ; CDD. pp. 417, 507 ; 2 SDD, 7S5 ; 1 SDD, 88 ; GWB, Tel., etc. ; ARB, 
Nos. 34, 19. 



officials and police — which would be a real guarantee that in practice 
the Servians would not carry on their subversive campaign against 
Austria.'"" Explanation was to be made at St. Petersburg, "in strict 
confidence with regard to" point 5, — the participation of Austrian 
officials in the subversive movement in Servia — that "this clause was 
interpolated merely out of practical considerations, and was in no 
way intended to infringe on the sovereignty of Servia."'' 

German officials maintained that "Servian concessions were all a Germany 
sham," and "The Servian Note, therefore is entirely a play for time."'^ y^ew\ ^'^™^ 
The reply was not printed in Germany, in full, until after July 28, 

nor in Austria, apparentlv, and was received in France after twenty Delay in 

' '^^ publishing. 

hours delay, and about the same, in Russia.'^ 

Military preparations began at once. Servia issued an order for Servia. 
immediate mobilization, Austria claiming this was done at 3 o'clock, 
about three hours before the Servian reply was put in.**" On the other 
hand, as early as July 11, at Budapest cannon and ammunition were 
being sent by Austria to the Servian frontier;" on the 20th military Austria. 
preparations were being made "in the vicinity of the Servian 
frontier."**- On the 22 and 23, "eight army corps" were said "to be 
ready to start on the campaign" ;'*' on the 25th Austria said Servia 
could still "bring about friendly solution by unconditional acceptance 
of our demands" but she would have to reimburse "all costs and 
damage incurred by us through our military measures,"^ indicating 
that she had already taken military steps, probably the mobilization 
of the eight corps. On the 26th Austria certainly began mobilization, 
at least in part.**' Germany began clearing of trees, placing arma- Germany, 
ment, constructing batteries, and strengthening wire entanglements 
on the French frontier.'" This was before France had begun.^' Russia France, 
authorized the mobilization of thirteen army corps, to be used if I^^ssia. 
Austria brought armed pressure on Servia, but only after further 
notice was given by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and on the 26th, 
"not a single horse and not a single reservist had been called up" 



76. CDD, p. 41; 2 SDD, 918; BBB. No. 48. (Communicated July 27, 
to Grey.) As to self-defense, it should he remembered that Austria had 
52,000,000 population, and Servia, 4,500,000. However, about half of the 
population of Austria-Hungary is of Slavic descent, with more or less of 
Servian sympathies, dominated by about 22,000,000 Germans and Magyars. 

77. CDD, p. 503 ; 1 SDD. S3 : ARB. Xo. 27. 

78. CDD, pp. 29, 423 ; 2 SDD, 901 ; BBB. No. 32 ; GWB, Tel., etc. 

79. CDD, pp. 282, 193, 506, 178, 270; 1 SDD, 637, 88, 607; 2 SDD, 
1361, 1340; ROB, Nos. 46. 13 ; FYB, Nos. 75 (2); 56. 

80. CDD, pp. 391, 500, 29: 2 SDD. 1477; 1 SDD, 76; 2 SDD, 900; 
SBB. No. 41 ; ARB, No. 23 ; BBB, No. 32. 

81. CDD. p. 146; 1 SDD. 5.'-.S ; FYB. No. 11. 

82. CDD, p. 388; 2 SDD, 1463; SBB, No. 31. 

83. CDD, pp. 150, 152 ; 1 SDD, 504, 566 ; FYB, Nos. 18, 20. 

84. CDD, p. 499 ; 1 SDD. 75 ; ARB. No. 20. 

85. CDD, 181 ; 1 SDD. 609 ; FYB, No. 57. 

86. CDD, p. 215 ; 1 SDD, 663 ; FYB, No. 106 ; CDD, p. 223 ; 1 SDD. 
674 ; FYB. No. 118. 

87. CDD. pp. 174. 503 ; 1 SDD. 602, 84 ; FYB, No. 50 ; ARB, No. 28. 



IT, 



but only "measures of preparation in the military districts of Kioff, 
Odessa, and perhaps Kasan and Moscow" had been taken. 



Sunday, July 26, 1914. 



Russia 
requests 
Austria to 
exchange 
views. 



French and 
German 

intercession. 



TEngland 

requests 

conference of 
flowers. 



'"Germany 
refuses. 



Kaiser 
returns. 



Rtissia asked Austria to exchange private views with her with the 
object of changing some of the demands of the ultimatum.''*' No 
answer being received promptly, she then asked Germany to advise 
or request Austria to do this.^" This however was not done, and 
Austria declined Russia's request two days later."" 

The German ambassador asked France to intercede with Russia, 
claiming that "the prevention of war depends on the decision of 
Russia." Prance replied "that Russia was moderate," there was "no 
doubt as to her moderation," and "Germany ought to act at Vienna, 
where her action would certainly be effective, with a view to avoid- 
ing military operations leading to the occupation of Servia." He 
refused, — "this could not be reconciled with the position taken up 
by Germany 'that the question concerned only Austria and Servia.' "" 

England asked France, Italy, and Germany to meet in London to 
confer in order to preserve the peace.-'- France,"' and Italy"^ imme- 
diately agreed to this. Russia also immediately agreed to this, "or 
any other proposal of a kind that would bring about a favorable 
solution of the conflict," if her own "direct conversations," already 
urged with Austria were denied.'"' Germany at once refused, — this 
"would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not be 
called together except at the request of Austria and Russia,""" and it was 
in vain that it was explained the plan "had nothing to do with arbitra- 
tion, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly in- 
terested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous 
situation." 

The Kaiser, "to the regret" of the German Foreign Office, suddenly 
returned on his own initiative, to Berlin, from Norway, where he had 
gone about three weeks before, ostensibly for his health."' It was 
feared "that His Majesty's sudden return may cause speculation and 
excitement." 



ARB, 



88. CDD, pp. 39, 40, 47, 177, 275; 2 SDD, 914. 916, 925, 1350; 1 SDD. 
606 ; BBB, Nos. 43. 45, 47 ; FYB, No. 54 ; ROB. No. 25. 

89. ODD, p. 275 : 2 SDD, 1351 ; BOB, No. 26. 

90. CDD, pp. 58, 517 ; .2 SDD, 939 ; 1 SDD, 101 ; BBB, No. 
No. 30. 

91. CDD, pp. 179. 181 ; 1 SDD. 607, 009 ; FYB, Nos. 50. 57. 

92. CDD, pp. 30, 38, 42. 45, 47. 52 ; 2 SDD, 902, 913. 918, 920. 924, 
925. 931 : BBB. Nos. 36. 42. 43, 49. 52, 53, 60. 

93. CDD, pp. 38, 47 ; 2 SDD, 913. 924 ; BBB, Nos. 42, 52. 

94. CDD, p. 43 : 2 SDD, 920 ; BBB. No. 49. 

95. CDD, pp. 47, 49 ; 2 SDD, 925. 927 ; BBB. Nos. 53, 55. 

96. CDD. pp. 38. 52. 515 ; 2 SDD. 914, 931 ; 1 SDD, 98 ; BBB, Nos. 43, 
60, 01. 62 ; ABB. No. 35. 

97. CDD. p. 29 ; 2 SDD, 901 : BBB. No. 33 ; Beck. Ev. in Case, p. 103. 



Monday, July 27, 1914. 

France urged that England, France, Germany, and Italy again re- ^q^|g® ^^ 
quest Servla and Austria not to invade each other's territory, but invasion, 
that more time be given for negotiations."* Germany immediately 
refused, "because that would be to set up a real conference to deal 
with the affairs of Austria and Russia," and she "could not consent 
to anything" of the kind."" It had already been explained that this Germany 

, ,, „ „ ,,,<<•,..•,, i 1 refuses to 

assumed specter of a conference, and mediation, meant no such join. 
thing as Germany urged, but only "friendly advice," "peaceful words," 
or "friendly conversations."""' 

Russia asked Germany to urge, — "to press with greater insistence"— Gemiany 
Austria to accept Russia's suggestion of direct conversations with fnre^ct con-'^^^ 
her "to draw up, by means of a private exchange of views," such versations. 
"a wording of the Austro-Hungarian demands" as "would be acceptable 
to both parties."^"' The German Secretary of State offered to telegraph 
to the German ambassador at Vienna "in this sense," but refused "to 
advise Austria to give way." On the next day Austria answered Austria 
she "could no longer recede, nor enter into any discussion about the ^^ ^^^*'' 
terms of the Austro-Hungarian note."^°- The Austrian Under Secre- 
tary of State informed the Russian ambassador at Vienna, that a 
skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, begun by the 
Servians.^"'-' The Russian ambassador then offered to do ''all he could Russia offers 
to keep the Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet se/vfa.'^'^'" 
take place" and would advise his government to urge Servia "to 
avoid any conflict as long as possible, and to fall back before an 
Austrian advance." The Secretary promised to "submit this sugges- 
tion to the Minister for Foreign Affairs."'"^ Nothing came of it. 

As just stated Austria claimed that acts of aggression had occurred -Servias 

allesred 
by Servian troops firing on Austrian troops "on the Danube" and invasion of 

"on the frontier," and this was alleged as one of the excuses for de- ^"'^^"a. 
daring war the next day, and refusing England's proposals for pre- 
venting "the outbreak of hostilities.'""' It is difficult to believe that 
little Servia should deliberately begin an attack on big Austria, just 
at a time when she knew all her friends were making every effort to 
prevent war. 

The German Secretary of State said "he was obliged to keep his German 

secretary not 



yet read 



98. CDD, pp. 183, 188, 189, 280 ; 1 SDD. 612, 618, 619 ; 2 SDD, 1357 ; Servian reply 
FYB, Nos. 61, 68, 70 ; ROB, No. 39. Servian repiy. 

99. CDD, pp. 190, 191, 280 ; 1 SDD, 622 ; 2 SDD, 1357 ; FYB, Nos. 73, 
74; ROB, No. 39. 

100. CDD, pp. 52, 181, 189, 278; 1 SDD, 609, 019; 2 SDD, 931 1354; 
BBB. No. 62 ; FYB, Nos. 59. 70 ; ROB, No. 34. 

101. CDD. p. 279 ; 2 SDD. 1356 ; ROB, No. 38. 

102. CDD. p. 70; 2 SDD, 954; BBB, No. 93 (1). 

103. CDD, p. 50 ; 2 SDD, 928 ; BBB. No. 56. 

104. CDD, p. 50 ; 2 SDD. 928 ; BBB, No. 56. 

105. CDD, pp. 50, 518, 519; 2 SDD. 928; 1 SDD. 102. 103; BBB, No. 
56; ARB, Nos. 40, 41. 



28 



engagements towards Austria," although he had "not yet had time" 
to read the Servian reply which he had received that morning. The 
French ambassador entreated him "in the name of humanity to weigh 
the terms in" his conscience and not to assume a part of the responsi- 
bility for the catastrophe which he was "allowing to be prepared.""" 
The German Chancellor told England that "we have at once started 
the mediation proposal in Vienna in the sense as desired by Sir Ed- 
ward Grey," and communicated Russia's desire "for a direct parley 
with Vienna," and that Austria answers "that after the opening of 
hostilities by Servia and the subsequent declaration of war, the step 
appears belated.""' The published records of neither Germany nor 
Austria disclose how or when mediation was started by Germany, nor 
how urgent it was, nor why it became "belated," — since war was not 
declared till the next day. 

Tuesday, July 28, 1914. 



Although yesterday Russia told Austria that she "was not prepared 
to give way again as she had * * * during the annexation crisis of 
1909,""* Austria declared "that no discussion could be accepted on 
basis of Servian note; war would be declared today, (28th); the well- 
known pacific character of the Emperor, might be accepted as a 
guarantee that war was both just and inevitable," and "Russia ought 
not to oppose operations like those impending, which did not aim at 
territorial aggrandizement, and which could no longer be postponed.""' 
The German ambassador at Paris stated "that Austria would respect 
the integrity of Servia," but as to "whether her independence also 
would be respected, he gave no assurance.""" Russia "would not be 
satisfied with any engagement which Austria might make on these 
two points" if she attacked Servia,'" and Sir Edward Grey thought 
it would be quite possible "without nominally interfering with the 
independence of Servia or taking away any of her territory to turn 
her into a sort of a vassal state.""- 

War was then declared at noon this day against Servia by Austria, 
and her army mobilized,"^ if it had not been before. 

Vl) to this jwint, five concrete proposals for peace, — a joint request 
by all the powers, except Germany, for an extension of the time for 
the Servian reply, — Russia's request for a modification of some of the 



100. ODD, p. 191 : 1 SDD. 622 : PYB. No. 74. 

107. CDD, 429, 430; 2 SDD, S06, 807; GWB, Nos. 14. 15, 16, (Scott. 
Nos. 16, 17. 18). 

108. CDD. p. 50 ; 2 SDD, 928 ; P.BR. No. 56. 

109. ODD, p. 52 ; 2 SDD, 9.S1 ; BBB, No. 62. 

110. CDD, p. 51 ; 2 SDD, 930 ; BBB, No. 59. 

111. CDD, p. 57 ; 2 SDD, 937 ; BBB, No. 72. 

112. CDD, p. 69 ; 2 SDD, 95.T ; BBB. No. 91. 

113. CDD. pp. 43, 51, 54, 515 ; 2 SDD. 920, 930, 934 ; 1 SDD. 99 : BBB. 
Nos. 50, 59, 66 ; ARB, No. 37. 



29 

Austrian demands, by a direct exchange of views between herself and 
Austria, — England's request that frontiers be not crossed by Austria 
or Servia until time was allowed for further consideration, — England 
and France's request that conversations by the disinterested powers, 
including Germany, take place at Vienna and St. Petersburg,— and 
England's proposal for a joint conference of the same powers at 
London, — had been made, all coming from England, France, or 
Russia, and all agreed to by them; but all had been rejected or de- 
layed by Austria and Germany."^ 

The Kaiser now took a hand. At 10:45 p. m. he telegraphed the Kaiser takes 
Czar of Russia to this effect: "The inscrupulous agitation which ^'^ 
has been going on for years in Servia" led to the murder; this spirit 
still dominates that country; all sovereigns have a common interest 
to see deserved punishment Inflicted. "I shall use my entire in- 
fluence to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a frank and satisfactory 
understanding with Russia.""^ 

Wednesday, July 29, 1914. 

The German ambassador informed Russia "in the name of the Germany's 
Chancellor, that Germany has not ceasM to exercise a moderating ^"^' '""■ 
influence at Vienna, and that she will continue to do so even after the 
declaration of war.""° What this "modera^ng influence" was is not 
revealed by the text of any document made public by Germany or 
Austria. The Chancellor told the British ambassador at Berlin "that 
events had marched too rapidly to act" on England's "suggestion that 
the Servian reply might form the basis of discussion"; that on receiv- 
ing the Servian reply he had "despatched a message to Vienna, in 
which he explained that, although a certain desire had, in his opinion, 
been shown in the Servian reply to meet the demands of Austria, 
he understood entirely that, without some sure guarantees that 
Servia would carry out in their entirety the demands made on her," 
Austria "could not rest satisfied In view of their past experience"; 
"that the hostilities which were about to be undertaken against Servia, 
had presumably the exclusive object of securing such guarantees," 
since Austria had "already assured" Russia "that they had no terri- 
torial designs." "He advised" Austria, "should this view be correct, 
to speak openly in this sense" and "such language would, he hoped, 
eliminate all possible misunderstandings;" and "since he had gone 
so far in giving advice at Vienna" he hoped England "would realize 
that he was sincerely doing all in his power to prevent danger of 



114. See Sazonof. SDD. p. 101 ; 2 SDD. 994 : BBB. No. 139. 

115. CDD, p. 431 ; 2 SDD, 808, (No. 22-1) ; GWB. No. 20. 

116. CDD, p. 71; 2 SDD, 9.55; BBB, No. 93 (2), 



30 



European complications," and "doing his best to support"' England's 
"efforts in the cause of general peace.""' 

The same day the German Secretary of State reminded the British 
ambassador at Berlin, that he had said "the other day that he had 
to be very careful of giving advice to Austria, as any idea that they 
were being pressed would be likely to cause them to precipitate mat- 
ters and present a fait accompli. This had, in fact, now happened, 
and he was not sure that his~communication of" England's "sugges- 
tion that Servia's reply offered a basis for discussion had not hasten- 
ed declaration of war" by Austria.^'* Truly German "mediation and 
advice" were not effective. 

This same day too, "The German ambassador came to tell M. 
Sazonof, (Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs), that if Russia does 
not stop her military preparations the German army will receive the 
order to mobilize." Sazonof replied that Russia's mobilization was 
caused by the "uncompromising attitude of Austria," and "that eight » 
Austro-Hungarian army corps are already mobilized.""" Sazonof also 
explained to the German ambassador that none of these military 
measures "were directed against Germany; neither should they be 
taken as aggressive measures against Austria-Hungary, their ex- 
planation being the mobilization of the greater part of the Austro- 
Hungarian army."^-° 

The French ambassador-«t St. Petersburg says "The tone in which" 
the German ambassador "delivered this communication has decided 
Russia this very night to order the mobilization of thirteen army 
corps which are to operate against Austria.'"-^ The German ambassa- 
dor must have acted with authority, and if so, German mediation at 
Vienna took the shape of threats at St. Petersburg, as requested by 
Austria the day before, to tell Russia — "in a friendly manner," that, 
— although Russia has given her word of honor that up to then 
mobilization had not been ordered, but would be in "the military dis- 
tricts which border on Austria-Hungary, — Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, and 
Kasan," if the Austrian troops "cross the Servian frontier,"^"should 
these measures be carried out, they would be answered by the most 
extensive counter measures, not only by the Monarchy but by our 
Ally, the German Empire."^-- 

Russia had the same day, apparently before she knew Austria had 
declared war, suggested that both direct discussions, and the plans 
for a conference of the four powers continue;'-^ but after Austria re- 
fused the further direct exchange of views with Russia, Sazonof said 



117. CDD, p. 58 ; 2 SDD, 939 ; BBB. No. 75. 

118. CDD, p. 59; 2 SDD. 940; BBB. No. 76. 

119. CDD, p. 210; 1 SDD, 658; FYB, No. 100. 

120. CDD, p. 71; 1 SDD. 955: BBB. No. 93 (2). 

121. CDD, p. 210 ; 1 SDD, 658 ; FYB. No. 100. 

122. CDD, p. 520, 524 ; 1 SDD, 104 ; ARB. No. 42. 

123. CDD, p. 60 ; 2 SDD, 941 ; BBB, No. 78. 



31 

that he would agree to auy arrangement approved by France, England, 

and Italy, or the four powers, "provided it was acceptable to Servia; Russia favors 

he could not, he said, be more Servian than Servia," and indicated 

that, if thought advisable, the Austrian ambassador might be called 

into the proposed conference. 

The German ambassador at London told Sir Edward Grey that the Germany 
German Chancellor was "endeavoring to mediate between Vienna and conference. 
St. Petersburg, and he hopes with good success." Sir Edward 
replied that Austria had declined this, but that the German govern- 
ment had before said "they were favorable in principle to mediation 
between Russia and Austria if necessary. They seemed to think that 
the particular method of conference, consultation or discussion, or 
even conversations a quatre in London too formal a method." He 
then "urged that the German Government should suggest amj method 
by which the influence of the four Powers could be used together to 
prevent war between Austria and Russia. France agreed, Italy 
agreed. The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was 
ready to be put in operation by any method that Germany could 
suggest; * * * by any method that Germany thought possible if only 
Germany would 'pres? the button' in the interests of peace. "''^ 

The French Prime Minister, Viviani, told the German ambassador 
at Paris that "if Germany wished for peace she should hasten to give 
her support to the British proposal for mediation"; the ambassador 
said "the words 'conference' or 'arbitration' alarmed Austria." "Vivi- 
ani retorted that it was not a question of words, and that it would be 
easy to find some other form for mediation." He added that "France 
sincerely desired peace, but that she was determined at the same 
time to act in complete harmony with her allies and friends."^-' The 
unsatisfactory answer to these suggestions of France and England is 
given tomorrow. The German ambassador at Vienna was still feign- 
ing "surprise that the Servian affairs should be of such interest to 
Russia."'-' 

The Czar of Russia, telegraphed the Kaiser at 1 p. m., saying: "I help^from ^"'^ 
am glad you are back in Germany. * * * j ^sk you to help me. An Kaiser, 
ignominious war has been declared against a weak country, and in 
Russia the indignation which I fully share is tremendous. I fear 
that very soon I shall be unable to resist the pressure exercised upon 
me and that I shall be forced to take measures which will lead to 
war. * * * I urge you in the name of our old friendship to do all 
in your power to restrain your ally from going too far.'"-' 



124. CDD, p. 63 : 2 SDD. 94G ; BBB. No. 84 also, CDD. pp. 08. 209, 28-5 ; 
2 SDD, 951, 1366: 1 SDD. 6.^6: BBB. No. 90; FYB, No. 98; ROB, No. 54. 

125. CDD, p. 286 ; 2 SDD, 1360 : ROB. No. 55. 

126. CDD, p. 73 ; 2 SDD, 958 ; BBB. No. 94. 

127. CDD, p. 431 ; 2 SDD, 809, No. 22. II ; GWB, No. 21. 



32 

Austria was then bombarding Belgrade, the capital of Servia.''^ 
The Kaiser answered the Czar's telegram at 6:30 p. m., saying: "I 
share your desire for the conservation of peace. * * * j cannot con- 
sider the action of" Austria "as an 'ignominious war'"; it is "an 
attempt to receive full guaranty that the promises of Servia are 
effectively translated into deeds." Austria "intended no territorial 
gain at the expense of Servia." * * * n is perfectly possible for 
Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Servian war without draw- 
ing Europe into the most terrible war it has even seen." "I believe 
that a direct understanding is possible and desirable between" Russia 
and Austria, which "my government endeavors to aid with all possi- 
ble effort." "Military measures by Russia which might be construed 
as a menace by" Austria "would accelerate a calamity which both of 
us desire to avoid and would undermine my position as mediator," 
which on your appeal for my aid "I willingly accepted."^-" 

It should be noted that the Czar had asked the Kaiser's help to 
restrain his ally from going too far. "What, if anything, the Kaiser 
did in the line of this request, is not divulged in the published records; 
but what he did otherwise will soon appear. 

The Czar answered at 8:20 p. m. "Thanks for your telegram which 
is conciliatory and friendly, whereas the official message presented 
today by your ambassador to my minister was conveyed in a very 
different tone. I beg you to explain this divergency. It would be 
right to give over the Austro-Servian problem to The Hague Tri- 
bunal. I trust in your wisdom and friendship.""" (See the threat 
of German mobilization, by the German ambassador, above.) 
England It should be noted that Sir Edward Grey today informed the Ger- 

involved. man ambassador at London, that in case Germany and France be- 

came involved he "did not wish him to be misled into thinking that 
we should stand aside, ""^ and at the same time he told France not 
to be "misled into supposing that we had decided what to do" "in 
such a contingency.""- 

Thursday, July 30, 1914. 

Kaiser's The Kaiser answered the last telegram of the Czar, at 1 a. m.: 

Rusefan Austria "has mobilized only against Servia, and only part of her army. 

mobilization jf Russia * * * mobilizes against" Austria, "the part of mediator 

interfere with 

mediation. with which you have entrusted me * * * and which I have accepted 



128. Baldwin, The "World War, p. 238 ; Beck, Evidence in the Case, p. 
113. (Archer, however, says not till afternoon.) 

129. CDD, p. 431 ; 2 SDD, 809. No. 22, III ; GWB, No. 22. 

130. CDD, p. 542 : 2 SDD, 1029 ; (This telegram is not printed with the 
others given in the GWB). 

131. CDD, pp C7, 78 ; 2 SDD, 950, 905 ; BBB, Nos, 89, 102. 

132. CDD, p. 65 ; 2 SDD, 948 ; BBB, No. 87. 



upon your express desire, is threatened if not impossible. * * * You 

have to bear the responsibility for war or peace."'^^ 

At 2 a. ni. the German ambassador at St. Petersburg, "completely 

broke down on seeing that war was inevitable," "appealed to Sazonof 

to make some suggestion which he could telegraph to the German 

government as a last hope.""S Sazonof replied: "The Emperor Russia makes 

. ,, . -r • ^ T another 

Nicholas is so anxious to prevent war that I am going to make -a proposition. 

new proposal to you in his name: 'If Austria, recognizing that her 
dispute with Servia has assumed the character of a question of 
European interest, declares herself ready to eliminate from her ulti- 
matum the clauses which are damaging to the sovereignty of Servia, 
Russia undertakes to stop all military preparations.' '""■ This was 
sent to Berlin at once, and answered by the German Secretary of Germany 
State, (Von Jagow), "that he considered it impossible for Austria down, 
to accept,'"''"' or "he found this proposal unacceptable to Austria."^^'' 
"Mediation" by Germany had again failed. At this moment news of 
proclamation of general mobilization by Austria reached St. Peters- 
burg,' "a although it seems not to have been declared till 1 a. m. the 
next morning.'"'b 

As to England, France, and Italy's request of yesterday that Ger- Powers 
many suggest oni/ method of preserving peace, — the German Secretary Germany to 
of State "to draw up himself the formula for the intervention of the ^ffj^g* '"^^ 
disinterested powers," — the Secretary of State said: "that to gain 
time, he had decided to act directly, and that he had asked Austria Referred to 
to tell him the ground on which conversations might be opened with '^°'^^- 
her,'"'* "and was still awaiting to hear from her ally.'"'^ "No answer 
had, however, yet been returned." The Chancellor said "he was 'press- Germany 
ing the button' as hard as he could, and that he was not sure whether butVon."^ 
he had not gone so far in urging moderation at Vienna that matters 
had been precipitated rather than otherwise."'*" Again the language 
in which moderation was urged, and the manner of 'pressing the 
button' are withheld; but the French ambassador, at Vienna, had 
word from Berlin, that the German ambassador at Vienna "is in- 
structed to speak seriously" to Austria, "against acting in the man- 
ner calculated to provoke European war," but unfortunately he "is 
himself so identified with extreme anti-Russian and anti-Servian 



133. CDD, p. 432 ; 2 SDD, 810, No. 22, V : GWB, No. 23. 

134. CDD, p. 75 ; 2 SDD. 900 ; BBB. No. 97. 

135. CDD, p. 212; 1 SDD, 660; FYB. No. 103. See also, CDD. pp. 75, 
91, 288, 291; 2 SDD, 960, 965, 981, 1369, 1373; BBB, Nos. 97, ]0:',, 120; 
ROB. Nos. 60, 67. 

136. CDD, 280 ; 2 SDD, 1371 ; ROB No. 63. 

137. CDD, p. 216 ; 1 SDD, 664 ; FYB. No. 107. 

137a. CDD, p. 297 ; 2 SDD, 1378 ; ROB, No. 77. See CDD, p. 216 ; 1 SDD, 
664 ; FYB, No. 107. 

137b. CDD, pp. 222 ; 1 SDD, 672 ; FYB, No. 115. 

138. CDD, p. 216; 1 SDD. 666: FYB, No. 109. 

139. CDD, p. 215 ; 1 SDD, 664 ; FYB, No. 107. 

140. CDD. p. 84 ; 2 SDD. 972 ; BBB, No. 107. 



34 



Czar's answer 
again urges 
Kaiser to 
put pressure 
on Austria. 



Germany 
asks England's 
aid to induce 
France and 
Russia to 
remain 
neutral. 



feeling in Vienna that he is unlikely to plead the cause of peace 
with entire sincerity."""^ 

The Czar answered the Kaiser's morning telegram, at 1:20 p. m., 
saying: "The military measures now taking form were decided upon 
five days ago, and for the reason of defence against the preparations 
of Austria. I hope * * * these measures will not influence in any 
manner your position as mediator. * * * We need your strong pres- 
sure upon Austria so that an understanding can be arrived at with 
us.""' It will be noted that the Kaiser's telegram of 6:30 the night 
before took the position that Russia should remain a spectator, while 
Austria crushed Servia "in the Austro-Servian war"; but the Czar 
was asking him to put pressure on to restrain his ally from going 
too far, -as he had promised to do in his telegram of the 2Sth., and 
which presaged so well. (Unfortunately there is no record of what, 
if any, effort was made by the Kaiser in this direction. It is difficult 
to believe he would not have been successful if he had made any 
real effort.) 

Prince Henry of Prussia telegraphed King George of England tell- 
ing him of Russia's military preparations, and "that France is mak- 
ing military preparations while we have not taken measures of any 
kind, but may be obliged to do so at any moment if our neighbors 
continue their preparations. This would then mean a European 
war," and proposed that he should use his "influence on France and 
also on Russia that they should remain neutral. * * * I consider 
this a certain and, perhaps, the only way of maintaining the peace 
of Europe.""- This telegram had the approval of the Kaiser. There 
is no indication of any pressure being put on Austria. She was still 
to be left free to crush Servia. 



140a. CDD, p. 74 ; 2 SDD, 959 ; BBB, No. 95. 

(a) Note. — Mr. Archer, (Thirteen Days, p. 134), and Mr. Ileadlam, 
(Twelve Days, p. 239), give a copy of a telegram, dated today, July 30, and 
printed in the Westminster Gazette of August 1, purporting to have been sent 
by the German Chancellor to the German ambassador at Vienna, saying : 
"We cannot expect Austria to negotiate with Servia, with which she is" 
at war. "The refusal, however, to exchange views with St. Petersburg would 
be a grave mistake. We are ready to fulfill our duty as an ally. We must, 
however refuse to be drawn into a world-conflagration through Austria not 
respecting our advice. Your excellency will express this to Count Berchtold 
with all emphasis and great seriousness." This telegram is not printed in 
either the GWB, or the ARB. Because the French ambassador heard of this 
proposed "serious" talk, on the same day, Mr. Archer thinks there is some 
probability of the telegram being genuine : if it is genuine^ it is the only bit 
of evidence, that has come to light in which, the actual words in which 
Germany put any pressure on Austria, are given. If it accomplished any- 
thing, it did no more than induce Austria to open up negotiations with 
Russia,- — only to be overthrown immediately by the Kaiser's demobilizing 
ultimatum. ' It is very doubtful, to me, if it was genuine, or that it had the 
effect supposed, in view of the record, given in the text, relating to the Kaiser's 
telegram of 2 o'clock of this day. It seems to me that a more obvious ex- 
planation of this belated, unofficially published, telegram is that it was in- 
vented and publlslied at a critical time, for English consumption, instead of for 
Austrian action. 

141. CDD. p. 432 ; 2 SDD. 810. No. 22, VI ; GWB, No. 23a. 

142. CDD, p. 538 ; 2 SDD, 1023. 



35 

King George answered: That England was "doing the utmost pos- King George 
sible in order to induce Russia and France to postpone further Aus1dft\old 
military preparations, provided that Austria declares herself satisfied Bein:ra(le as a 
with the occupation of Belgrade and the neighboring Servian terri- 
tory as a pledge for a satisfactory settlement of her demands, while 
at the same time the other countries suspend their preparations for 
war. I rely on William applying his 'great influence in order to in- 
duce Austria to accept this proposal.""' It seems that the suggestion 
that Austria hold Belgrade as a pledge was made July 29, by Sir 
Edward Grey, to the German ambassador at London, who, today 
(30th) said the "German government would endeavor to influence Germany 
Austria, after taking Belgrade and Servian territory in region of fnfluence 
frontier, to promise not to advance further, while Powers endeavored Austria, 
to arrange that Servia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify 
Austria. Territory would of course be evacuated when Austria was 
satisfied.'"" The German Secretary of State says "he asked Austro- 
Hungarian government whether they would be willing to accept 
mediation" on this basis, but "has up till now received no reply" No reply, 
and "fears Rilssian mobilization against Austria will have increased 
difficulties, as Austria, who has as yet only mobilized against Servia, 
will probably find it necessary also against Russia," and if Russia 
will agree "to above basis" and "take no steps which might be re- 
garded as an act of aggression against Austria," there is some chance 
to preserve peace."'*' The German Chancellor says "he had begged 
Austria to reply to" this proposal, and "had received a reply to the 

effect that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs would take wishes Referred to 

„ , , T-i i.1, • • >>ii,- Austrian 

of the Emperor this morning. '*" Emperor. 

Yesterday the Russian ambassador at Vienna had requested that 

direct conversations between Sazonof and the Austrian ambassador at 

St. Petersburg be resumed, but his request was "flatly refused."'" 

Today, however, "it was agreed that pourparlers should be resumed" Disfus.sions 

,.„ , . . , . „ . , , ,, ,. to be renewed, 

not to modify the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, but only "to discuss 

what settlement would be compatible with the dignity and prestige" 

of Russia and Austria. This revived hope, to be dispelled instantly, 

for just then "news of the German mobilization arrived in Vienna.""*^ 

(It is claimed that this was a mistake, and is considered below.) The 

instructions given to the Austrian ambassador at St. Petersburg for 

carrying on the discussion were to make "any explanation he desired 

with regard to the note — which in any case appears to be outstripped 

by the outbreak of war; * * * it was never intended to depart in But not to 

change 
demands. 



143. CDD. p. 538; 2 SDD, 1024. 

144. CDD, p. 78 ; 2 SDD, 9G5 ; EBB, No. 103. 
14.5. CDD, p. 75 ; 2 SDD. 901 : BBB, No. 98. 

146. CDD. p. 87 ; 2 SDD. 97.5 ; BBB. No. 112. 

147. CDD. p. 205 ; 1 SDD, 652 ; FYB. No. 93. 

148. CDD, p. 213 ; 1 SDD, 662 ; FYB. No. 104. 



36 



any way from the points contained in the note." It was stated in 
these instructions that Austria "had mobilized exclusively against 
Servia; against Russia, not a single man,'"" although in the earlier 
conversation moblization in Galicia (which would be toward Russia) 
was admitted, but stated to "have no aggressive intention and" is 
only to maintain "the situation as it stands."^"" 

France reported that Germany had recalled "the reservists by tens 
of thousands"; "officers of reserve have been summoned"; "the Ger- 
man army has its outposts on our frontier; the whole 16th army 
corps from Metz, reinforced by part of the 8th from Treves and 
Cologne, occupies the frontier from Metz to -Luxemburg; the 15th 
army corps from Strassburg is massed on the frontier." And "al- 
though Germany has made her covering dispositions a few hundred 
meters from the frontier along the whole front from Luxemburg to 
the Vosges, and has transported her covering troops to their war 
positions, we have kept our troops ten kilometers (6 miles) from 
the frontier and forbidden them to approach nearer." "On two oc- 
casions yesterday (29th) German patrols penetrated our territory."^=^ 

en^gland's neuteaj.it y. 



This, perhaps, is a good place to say something more about Eng- 
land's neutrality, — "perfidious Albion." As we saw above, (July 25), 
England was urged from the first to stand solidly with Russia and 
Prance, — otherwise Germany and Austria would count on her neutral- 
ity, — but refused on the ground that she could mediate with them 
better as a friend, than as an ally of Russia.^'- On July 24, she post- 
poned the demobilization of her First Fleet, assembled a few days 
before at Portland, for review. On the 27th this was made public,^=^ 
and the Russian ambassador at London was told it meant nothing 
more "than diplomatic action was promised.'"^* On the same day 
the German ambassador was informed by Grey "that our fieet was 
to have dispersed today, but we had felt unable to let" it do so; 
"there was no menace in what we had done, but owing to the possi- 
bility of an European conflagration, it was impossible for us to dis- 
perse our forces at the moment."^'' 

As we saw above, yesterday afternoon, (29th), Grey warned the Ger- 
man ambassador at London that Germany could not count on Eng- 
land's neutrality if all efforts to preserve peace failed.'*^ The German 



149. 
150. 
151. 
106. 
152. 
153. 
154. 
155. 
156. 



CDD, p. 525 ; 1 SDD. Ill ; ARB, No. 50. 
ODD, p. 213 ; 1 SDD, 662 ; FYB. No. 104. 
CDD, pp. 76, 214 ; 2 SDD, 962 ; 1 SDD, 663 : 



BBB, No. 99; FYB, No. 



CDD, pp. 14. 22, 39 ; 2 SDD. SSO. 890, 915 ; BBB, Nos. 6, 17, 44. 

CDD, p. 187 ; 1 SDD, 017 ; FYB, No. 66. 

CDD, p. 41 ; 2 SDD, 917 : BBB, No. 47. 

CDD, p. 43 : 2 SDD, 918 ; BBB. No. 48. 

CDD, pp. 67, 05; 2 SDD, 950, 948; BBB. Nos. 89, 87. 



ambassador sent a telegram to that effect, which reached Berlin late 
that night."' Before it is said to have been delivered, the German 
Chancellor, who "had just returned from Potsdam," invited the British 
ambassador to call on him that evening. He said, "should Austria 
be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might become in- 
evitable owing to Germany's obligation as Austria's ally," and made 
"the following strong bid for British neutrality," saying that "so far Germany 
as he was able to judge * * * Great Britain would never stand by and EngUgh 
allow France to be crushed; * * * that was not the object at which neutrality. 
Germany aimed;" if the "neutrality of Great Britain were certain 
every assurance would be given to" England that Germany "aimed at 
no territorial acquisition at the expense of France should" Germany 
be "victorious in any war that might ensue." When asked "about 
the French colonies, he said he was unable to give a similar under- 
taking," but would respect the territory of Holland and Belgium if 
her adversaries did the same. The British ambassador answered at 
once that he did not think England would bind herself, but would 
"desire to retain full liberty.""* Sir Edward Grey answered this 
"bid," today, (30th), this way: England "cannot for a moment enter- England 
tain the Chancellor's proposal" to bind herself "to neutrality on such bound! ^° ^ 
terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while 
French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany 
does not take French territory" in Europe. "Such a proposal is un- 
acceptable, for France * * * could be so crushed as to lose her posi- 
tion as a great Power, and become subordinate to German policy; it 
would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at 
the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this 
country would never recover." The Chancellor also asks us to 
bargain away our interest in the neutrality of Belgium. "We could 
not entertain that bargain either."™ 

Today also the German ambassador asked "why Great Britain was Englu^h 
taking military measures both on lan^ and sea" and was told "that '"" ' '^'^ ^'^^' 
these measures had no aggressive character, but the situation was 
such that each power must be ready. "^'"^ 

Friday, July 31, 1914. 

At 1 a. m. today Austria declared mobilization for all men between 
19 and 42 years of age.'"^ 

The Russian ambassador at Vienna reported that Austria is deter- Russia will 
mined not to yield to intervention of powers, and was moving troops "°* yi^^'i^- 

157. CDD, pp. 78, 76; 2 SDD, 965, 961; BBB. Nos. 102, 9S. 

158. CDD, p. 64 ; 2 SDD. 947 ; BBB, No. 85. 

159. CDD, p. 77: 2 SDD. 964; BBB. No. 101. 

160. CDD. p. 290; 2 SDD, 1372; ROB, No. 65. 

161. CDD. p. 222 ; 1 SDD. 672 ; FYB. No. 115. 



Russia's and 
England's 
proposals fail. 



Germany 
requested 
to urge 
mediation. 



Further 
proposals by 
England. 



against Russia, as well as against Servia. Russia then ordered gen- 
eral mobilization/"- early in the day. 

Russia's proposition to stop military preparations if Austria would 
recognize the European character of the Servian question, and allow 
some modification of the terms of the ultimatum, (which the German 
Secretary of State, yesterday refused to forward to Austria), and 
England's proposition that Austria hold Belgrade as a pledge, and 
stop further military advances, (referred to the Austrian Emperor 
to he answered this morning), were amalgamated into one to the 
effect: If Austria will agree to check her advance on Servian terri- 
tory; recognize the dispute is of European interest; and allow the 
powers to determine whether Servia can satisfy Austria without 
impairing her independence and sovereignty, Russia will maintain 
her waiting attitude.^'" This was sent to Vienna at once, but neither 
it nor the original proposition seems to have received any considera- 
tion.^-* 

On the 29th England urged Germany to propose some method by 
which the four powers could work together to preserve peace, but 
Russia insisted that Austria suspend military operations against 
Servia in the meantime, otherwise mediation would drag on and 
give Austria time to crush Servia. Sir Edward Grey, however, 
thought that mediation might still be possible, even after Belgrade 
was seized, if Austria would advance no further, "pending an effort 
of powers to mediate between her and Russia," and that it "was more 
important than ever that Germany should take up" this matter with 
Austria.^'" This seems to have been sent through Germany the next 
day to Austria,^"'' and reply sent today, (31st), by Austria, but not 
received till August 1, at London and St. Petersburg, to this effect: 
"We are quite prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir E. Grey to 
negotiate between us and Servia. The conditions are * * * that our 
military action against Servia should continue to take its course" 
and England should induce Russia to bring to a standstill her mobil- 
ization against us, and we will cancel our defensive milita,ry counter- 
measures in Galicia.^' Again German mediation had only had the 
effect that Austria persisted in her derhand that she be allowed a 
free hand to crush Servia, while negotiations went on. 

Today Sir Edward Grey made two further proposals to Germany: 
1. That if Germany would sound Austria, he would sound St. Peters- 
burg, as to whether it would not be possible for the four powers to 



162. CDD, p. 87 ; 2 SDD, 97G ; BBB, No. 11.3. Also CDD, p. 527 ; 1 SDD, 
113; ARB, No. 52. 

163. CDD, p. 91, 291: 2 SDD. 981. 1373; BBB, No. 120; ROB, No. 67; 
CDD. pp. 219, 220 : 1 SDD. 669. 670 ; FYB, No.s. 112, 113. 

164. CDD. p. 102: 2 SDD. 994; BBB, No. 139. 

165. CDD, p. 66: 2 SDD, 949; BBB. No. 88. 

166. CDD, p. 75 ; 2 SDD, 961 ; BBB. No. 98. 

167. CDD. p. 526 ; 1 SDD, 112 ; ARB, No. 51. 



guarantee Austria full satisfaction against Servia, without impair- 
ing her sovereignty and Integrity, on the one hand, and on the other, 
guaranteeing to Russia that Servia's sovereignty and integrity, should 
not be impaired, by Austria. And 2, he said: "If Germany could 
get any reasonable proposal put forward which made it clear that 
Germany and Austria were striving to preserve European peace, and 
that Russia and France would be unreasonable If they rejected it," 
he "would support it at St. Petersburg and at Paris," and if they would 
not accept it England "would have nothing more to do with the con- 
sequences." The only answer was that "it was Impossible for" Ger- 
many "to consider any proposal until they had received an answer 
from Russia to their" ultimatum to demobilize immediately, sent that 
day and referred to below. ^''^ 

Yet, for some reason, not clearly disclosed by the record, Austria Austria agreea 
today suddenly faced about, and agreed to renew discussions, — and " '"cubj. 
"far from harboring any designs against the integrity of Servia, was 
in fact ready to discuss the grounds of her grievances against Servia 
with the other Powers";""'' "to discuss with Russia" and "to accept a 
basis of mediation which is not open to the objection to the formula 
which Russia originally suggested";'"" "to discuss the substance of the 
Austrian ultimatum to Servia.''^ Austria then knew that Russia had 
ordered general mobilization, early in the day,'"' and had herself taken 
military measures in Galicia, but these had no aggressive intention, 
and were not to stop pourparlers between Russia and Austria, and 
from which she hoped "things will quiet down all round."'"' 

Russia immediately accepted this offer, suggested "that the dis- 
cussions should take place in London with the participation of the 
Great Powers," and hoped England "would assume the direction of 
these discussions." "It would be very important that Austria should 
meanwhile put a stop provisionally to her military action on Servian 
territory," but this was not made a condition of Russia's acceptance.'"^ 
Here seemed to be a wide-open opportunity for discussion and media- 
tion, with every chance of settlement, — but war "is the game that 
kings play at" 

The Czar telegraphed the Kaiser, as to Russian military prepara- Czar's 
tions, which had been so strenuously objected to: "It is technically about Rueeia'a 
impossible to discontinue our military preparations which have been preparations 
made necessary by the Austrian mobilization. * * * As long as the 
negotiations between Austria and Servia continue, my troops will 
undertake no provocative action. I give you my solemn word there- 

1G8. CDD, pp. 86, 92; 2 SDD, 974. 982; BBB. Nos. Ill, 121. 

169. CDD, p. 293; 2 SDD, 1375; ROB, No. 73. 

170. CDD, p. 97 ; 2 SDD, 988 : BBB, No. 131. 

171. CDD, p. 97; 2 SDD, 989: BBB. No. 1.33. 

172. CDD, p. 527; 1 SDD, 113: ARB, No. 52. 

173. CDD. p. 527; 1 SDD. 113: ARB. No. 53. 

174. CDD, p. 98; 2 SDD, 989; BBB, No. 133. 



40 



Qjj 175 rpj^jg assumes Austria had agreed to reopen negotiations, (as 
she had), and although she had not agreed to stop her military meas- 
ures, Russia was willing to give assurance that her troops would 
take no action. 
Kaiser's This telegram of the Czar was crossed by one to the Czar, sent at 

about^Russia'B 2 P- m. by the Kaiser, mainly scolding him for mobilizing against 
mobilization. Austria, "my ally," whereby "my mediation has become almost illus- 
ory," but saying further "I receive reliable news that serious prepara- 
tions for war are going on on my eastern frontier. The responsibility 
for the security of my country forces me to measures of defence." 
* * * "No one threatens the honor and peace of Russia which might 
well have awaited the success of my mediation." * * * "tl^^e peace of 
Europe can still be preserved by you if Russia decides to discontinue 
those military preparations which • menace Germany and Austria- 
Hungary.""" It is clear that since Austria had already agreed to 
negotiate further, of which the Czar already had knowledge. Austria's 
change was not due to the Kaiser's "mediation," or the Kaiser was 
ignorant of his own success, up to 2 o'clock, or prevaricated. I can- 
not believe he was ignorant. Neither can I believe his Chancellor 
and Secretary of State were ignorant of Austria's agreement to ne- 
gotiate further, — although the latter, late this evening, declared that 
the Kaiser and the Foreign Office "had even up to last night been 
urging Austria to show willingness to continue discussions, — but 
Russian mobilization had spoilt everything.""" This last statement 
was untrue, for Austria knew Russia had issued order for general 
mobilization before she agreed to negotiate further,'"* and the claim 
of the German Secretary of State, made the next day, "that Austria's 
readiness to discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna," 
was false."" 
Germany's Notwithstanding this agreement of Austria, and notwithstanding 

Rus'Sa^"™*" that "so long as conversation with Austria continued" the Czar "un- 
dertook that not a single man should be moved across the frontier," — 
all of which must have been known to the Kaiser and his Chancellor, — 
they sent an ultimatum to Russia, at midnight that night, July 31, 
to be answered within 12 hours, that is by noon, Saturday, demanding 
that Russia immediately demobilize her whole army, against both 
Austria, and Germany, — "if Russia does not stop every measure of 
war against us and against Austria-Hungary within 12 hours, and 
notifies us definitely to this effect," mobilization of the German army 
is bound to follow; "although we have up to this hour made no 
preparations for mobilization, Russia has mobilized her entire army 



175. CDD, p. 411 ; 2 SDD. 778 ; GWB, Statement Aug. 3 

176. CDD, p. 411 : 2 SDD, 778 ; GWB, Statement Aug. 3d. 

177. CDD, p. 92; 2 SDD, 982; BBB, No. 121. 

178. CDD, p. 527 ; 1 SDD. 113 ; ARB, Nos. 52. 53. 

179. CDD, p. 100; 2 SDD, 993; BBB. No. 138. 



41 

and navy, hence also against us," and we have thereby "been forced 
for the safety of the country to proclaim the threatening state of 
war, (Eriegsgcfahrzustand) which does not yet imply mobilization."^'" 

Austria had mobilized at 1 a. m. ; Russia, "early in the day," "as Mobilization 
a result of the general mobilization of Austria and of the measures ^ ermany. 
for mobilization taken secretly, but continuously, by Germany for the 
last six days,"'*' as reported by the French ambassador at St. Peters- 
burg, in contradiction of the German Chancellor's statement above. 
The "state of danger of war," {Kriegsgefahrzustand-ioar-danger-state) 
is admittedly a German technical term, which after being proclaimed, 
according to the Chancellor, "Mobilization would follow almost im- 
mediately" ;'-= and according to the German ambassador's statement 
to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, the publication of this 
was impending as early as the 29th, "and under the protection of this 
screen," after its publication at mid-day today, (31st),"*' Germany 
"immediately began mobilization in the proper sense of the word.""* 

The Gervian Chancellor's telegram above to Russia, to demobilize 
within 12 hours, says that "we have up to this hour made no prepara- 
tions for mobilization." "At the same time the Imperial (German) 
ambassador in Paris was instructed to demand from the French Gov- 
ernment a declaration within 18 hours whether it would remain 
neutral in a Russo-German war.'"'^ The text of the telegram sent to 
France, (as it appears in the German text of the German White 
Book), also says "we ourselves have taken no measures towards 
mobilization." However, the German "only authorized translation" 
into English, leaves out this statement. 

Since Germany's ultimata to Russia and France, are specifically 
based on her alleged knowledge of Russia's order for general mobil- 
ization, and Russia's order was itself based on the alleged mobiliza- 
tion of Austria and Germany, it is necessary to look into these matters 
a little more. There is no important difference, as between Austria 
and Russia, — both understood they were mobilizing against one an- 
other, but not with aggressive purposes, while the discussions were 
going on as agreed. As between Germany and Russia, the documents 
show much uncertainty. 

When Germany sent her "demobilizing ultimatum" to Russia, she 
undoubtedly had knowledge of Russia's order of mobilization; the 
hour when the telegram was sent is not given; it however was de- 
livered at midnight;"" the one sent to France, "at the same time," 



180. CDD. p. 433 ; 2 SDD, Sll, No. 23 ; GWB. Ex. 24. 

181. CDD, p. 223: 1 SDD, 674; FYB, No. 118. 

182. CDD, p. 80 : 2 SDD. 975 ; BBB. No. 112. 

183. CDD, p. 222 ; 1 SDD, 673 ; FYB, No. 117. 

184. CDD, p. 231 ; 1 SDD, G81 ; FYB. No. 127. 

185. CDD. p. 412 ; 2 SDD, 779 ; GWB, Statement Aug. 3. 

186. CDD, p. 412 ; 2 SDD. 779 ; GWB, Statemont Aus. 3. 



42 

and marked with "utmost speed,'' was delivered at 7 p. m.^" The 
Kaiser said in his telegram to King George, sent in the evening, that 
his Chancellor had just heard that "Nicholas this evening has ordered 
the mobilization of his entire army and fleet." Evening, in Germany, 
means from 5 to 10 p. m. In the Kaiser's telegram above, sent at 
2 p. m., he complains of Russia's mobilization against his* ally, Austria, 
not against Germany, but only of "reliable news of serious prepara- 
tions for war going on on my eastern front." If he had then had 
knowledge of the mobilization of Russia's "entire army and navy, 
hence also against us," he would have said so; yet the German au- 
thorized English text, (for use in England), of the statement made 
August 3d by the German Foreign Office, (after war was declared 
with Russia), says "the mobilization of all the Russian forces ob- 
viously directed against us and already ordered in the afternoon was 
in full swing. Notwithstanding, the telegram of the Czar was sent 
at 2 o'clock that same afternoon." The German text of' the same 
document (for use in Germany), says that Russia mobilized in the 
Tnorning.^^^ It seems a reasonable inference. that Germany first learned 
of Russia's mohilization, in the evening, (after 5 p. m.), instead of 
afternoon, (2 p. m.), or in the morning, as stated in the juggled 
documents. Is there any reason for this juggling? Let us consider. 

Germany's ultimatum to Russia to demohlize, also said that Russia's 
mobilization was the cause of Germany's declaring her "state of 
danger of war," (Kiiegsgefahrziistand, literally, war-clanger-state), 
also. This was decided on at mid-day that day,"" at least two hours 
before the German authorized English text of the statement of August 
3d, says Russia had mobilized, and several hours before the Kaiser 
knew of it in the evening; for German use at least it therefore would 
be necessary to allege that Russia's mobilization was known in 
Germany in the morning, otherwise Germany's declaration of a 
"state of danger of war," could not be based on the reasons claimed. 

It has come to light since that the German proclamation decided 
on at mid-day, instead of announcing a "state of danger of war," 
(Eriegsgefahrznstand), as told to England, France and Russia, ac- 
tually proclaimed a "state of war," (Kriegsziistand, — war-state), — 

{das ReichsgeMet wlrd hierdurch in Eriegszustand erklart) .^^^ 

Just before 2 o'clock, a director of the North German Lloyd, sent to 
Berlin to ascertain conditions, telegraphed his board, "that the 
declaration of a state of war (Kriegsziistand) , would at once be made 
public," and later in the day notified them of "the declaration of the 



187. CDD, pp. 88, 222, 527 ; 2 SDD, 978 ; 1 SDD, 673, 114 ; BBB, No. 
117 ; FYB, No. 117 ; ARB. No. 54. 

188. CDD, p. 412 : 2 SDD, 779 : GWB. Statement, Aug. 3. 

189. CDD, p. 222: 1 SDD. 673: FYB. No. 117. 

190. Wilson. H. W., New Light on Germanv's Treachery, Nineteenth 
Century, June, 1917. pp. 1204-1214. 



43 

state of war for the German Empire, owing to tlie threatening danger 
of war," — again not giving Russian mobilization as the reason, but 
only the threatening danger of war."' Now, the difference between 
Kriegsgefahrzxistand, {war-clanger-state) , and Kriegszustand, ( war- 
state), is important, for the German mobilization cards, held by Ger- 
man soldiers, direct them automatically to report at once to their 
headquarters, "upon the existence of a 'state of war," " but not on 
the existence of a "state of danger of war." So that by this trick 
of proclaiming a "state of war" at mid-day, July 31, instead of "a 
state of danger of war" as reported to the other governments, they 
were misled, and the German soldiers called to their posts. 

But Russia mobilized because she understood Germany was secretly Russian and 
doing so. Did she have any substantial reason to think so? mobilization. 

In the evening of July 29, an Extraordinary Council was held at 
Potsdam with the military authorities, under the presidency of the 
Kaiser, and decided on mobilization, and probably on the invasion 
of Belgium. About 1 o'clock p. m., July 30, the Lokal Anzeiger, a 
semi-official newspaper, in a special edition, published news of the 
mobilization of the German army and fleet."- This was immediately 
telegraphed to Russia,"' — 18 to 20 hours before Russian mobilization 
was ordered. News of the German mobilization was received in 
Vienna at about the same time."* 

At 2 o'clock p. m., the German Secretary of State, telephoned the 
French and Russian ambassadors at Berlin, that "the news of mobil- 
ization of the German army and fleet, which has just been announced, 
is false; that the news sheets had been printed in advance so as to 
be ready for all eventualities, and that they were put on sale in the 
afternoon, but that they now have been confiscated."'''' The English 
and Austrian ambassadors do not seem to have been so notified. The 
French ambassador at Berlin said he believed "that all the measures 
for mobilization which can be taken before the general order of 
mobilization have already been taken here, and that they are anxious 
here to make us publish our mobilization first, in order to attribute 
the responsibility to us.'"'"' The same reasons and remarks would 
equally apply to Russia. 

It has since been learned that the Berlin correspondent for a 
Vienna newspaper, at 10 o'clock a. m.', July 30, telegraphed his paper 
announcing that German mobilization had been proclaimed, and that • 
he had received this news "from one of the Emperor's staff." So, 
too, it now appears that four other Berlin newspapers, besides the 



191. The Kronprinzessln, (1916), 228 Fed. Rep. 940, 901. 

192. CDD, p. 213 ; 1 SDD, 002 ; FYB, No. 105. 

193. CDD, p. 289 ; 2 SDD. 1370 ; ROB, No. 01. 

194. CDD, 213; 1 SDD, 061; FYB, No. 104. 
19.5. CDD. p. 289 ; 2 SDD. 1370 ; ROB, No. 02. 
196. CDD, p. 214 ; 1 SDD, 002 ; FYB. No. 105. 



u 

Lokal Anzeiger, at the same time published special editions announc- 
ing mobilization by Germany. It is difficult to believe that all of these 
could suddenly have conceived such an idea at the same time as to 
special editions, unless they had been authoritatively so informed.'" 
On the same day the 20th French army corps at Nancy intercepted a 
telephone message between Metz and Strassburg, saying that mobil- 
ization began that evening. After the German Secretary of State 
said this publication was false, the Russian ambassador at Berlin so 
notified his home government, as above given. 

Other facts however make it certain that what was substantially 
equivalent to mobilization"^ was going on in Germany from July 21, 
when it was secretly begun by Germany's peculiar preliminary no- 
tice.'™ On the 23d, German officers on leave in Basle were ordered 
to return to Germany.-"" On the 24th, the colonels of the German 
regiments at Metz, began giving their officers instructions as to the 
duties of covering troops, only given immediately before mobiliza- 
tion. On the 25th railway stations in Germany were filled with sol- 
diers in uniform, and for the next two days movement by trains of 
cavalry, artillery, and infantry toward the Belgian frontier was be- 
gun. We have already noted above the German activities on the 
French frontier on this date. On the 26th, the German fleet in 
Norway was ordered to return to Germany.-"' Reservists were di- 
rected to hold themselves at the disposition of the Kommanclatur at 
any moment.-'" On the 27th motor car owners in Baden were secretly 
notified (under penalty of fine) to hold their cars at the disposal of 
the military authorities within two days after call.-"' Men on leave 
were ordered to rejoin their regiments; five classes of reservists, 
(1,250,000 men), were called; these with the peace strength, (over 
800,000 men), made more than 2,000,000 men; German officers at 
Antwerp were secretly directed to report to their regiments; German 
troops began to deploy on the Luxemburg frontier. On the 28th and 
29th uniformed troops were passing through Frankfort from Darm- 
stadt, Cassel and Mayence, which were full of soldiers, and bridges 

197. Wilson, H. W., New Light on Germany's Treachery, Nineteenth 
Century, June. 1917, pp. 1204-1214. 

198. "Careful usage distinguishes between" militarii preparations and 
moMlization, "though it is hard to draw the line." Mobilization means to 
make mobile, making ready to move, bringing together men, materials, and 
all other military paraphernalia for instant use in war, such as filling up the 
regiments of the first line to full war strength by recalling men on furlough, 
summoning reservists and forming them into second and third lines, corre- 
sponding to the first line, taking over railways, and collecting and equipping 
all the machinery of transportation and communication, — telegraphs, tele- 
phones, motor cars, horses, vehicles, ships, etc., for army service; gathering, 
forwarding and providing for the distribution of arms, ammunition, uniforms, 
food supply, etc., necessary before beginning to move to various places of 
assembly, to be from there deployed in battle array. 

199. CDD, pp. 134, 149: 1 SDD. 544, 562, FYB, Nos. 3, 15. 

200. CDD, p. 182 ; 1 SDD, 612 ; FYB, No. 60. 

201. CDD, p. 182 ; 1 SDD. 612 ; FYB, No. r,8. 

202. CDD, p. 182 ; 1 SDD. 611 ; FYB, No. 59. 

203. CDD, p. 182 ; 1 SDD, 612 ; FYB, No. 00. 



45 

and railways were guarded, under pretext of preparation for autumn 
manoeuvers;'"* mills in Alsace were directed to stop deliveries to 
clients and hold supplies for the army; at Strassburg motor-guns 
were going forward; non-commissioned officers of Bavarian infantry 
regiments at Metz, in Bavaria on harvest leave, received orders to 
return immediately, under pretext of change in autumn manoeu- 
ers.-"' Hamburg American and North German Lloyd steamers were 
directed to embark reservists. On the 29th the whole German cover- 
ing force were at their posts on the French frontier; 30 military 
trains passed between Metz and Treves, and the ISth army corps 
was concentrated at Frankfurt. In Bavaria and Wurtemburg army 
corps were marching west. The Ersatz. — reservists, — (1,500,000 men), 
received notices which automatically called them up on the proclama- 
tion of a state of war. This was the condition of things when the 
War Council met that evening. We have already noted the German 
military activities on the French frontier on the 30th. By that time 
an army of more than 3,500,000 men was practically mobilized by 
Germany. Yet the Chancellor, about 5 p. m., July 31, telegraphs 
Russia saying "we have up to this hour made no preparations for 
mobilization."-'"' On the other hand Sazonof said on the 30th, "that 
absolute proof was in the possession of Russian Government that Ger- 
many was making military and naval preparations against Russia — • 
more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland."""' Which 
was probably correct?-"' 

But without any reference as to who mobilized first, the Kaiser, after 
knowing that Austria had expressed a willingness to negotiate with responsibility. 
Russia, or with all the Powers, and after he had the Czar's promise 
on his honor that his army would take no action as long as negotia- 
tions continued, sent this ultimatum to Russia, to be answered within 
12 hours demanding that she demoMlize her whole army, against 
both Austria and Germany, and without any promise or suggestion 
that he or Austria would do the same. The reason why demobilization 
against Austria as well as against Germany was demanded, was, as 
stated by the Secretary of State, Von Jagow, "in order to prevent 
Russia from saying all her mobilization was only directed against 
Austria.""^"" 



204. ODD, p. 202 ; SDD, 648 ; FYB. No. 88. 
20.5. CDD, p. 202 : 1 SDD. 649 ; FYB. No. 89. 

206. CDD, p. 433 2 SDD. 811. No. 23 ; GWB. No. 24. 

207. CDD, p. 75 ; 2 SDD, 900 ; BBB, No. 97. 

208. The facts conceruing mobilization by Germany above given for which 
no specific reference is given, are from Wilson's article in the Nineteenth 
Century, for June. 1917, New Light on Germany's Treachery, pp. 1204-1214. 

209. CDD, p. 92 ; 2 SDD, 982 ; BBB. No. 121. 



4G 



Saturday, August 1, 1914. 



The Csar answered the Kaiser, (not within the 12 hour limit, but 
at 2 o'clock), saying "I comprehend that you are forced to mobilize, 
but I should like to have from you the same guaranty which I have 
given you, viz., that these measures do not mean war and that we 
shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of our two countries, and 
the universal peace which is so dear to our hearts."-'" 

The Kaiser answered: "I have shown yesterday to your govern- 
ment the way (that is, by immediate demobilization) through which 
alone war may yet be averted. Although I asked for a reply by today 
noon, no telegram from my ambassador has reached me with the 
reply of your government. I therefore have been forced to mobilize 
my army. An immediate and unmistakable reply of your govern- 
ment is the sole way to avoid endless misery. Until I receive this 
reply I am unable, to my great grief, to enter upon the subject of your 
telegram."-" 

At 12:52 p. m. the German Chancellor notified the German ambassa- 
dor at St. Petersburg that "If the Russian Government gives no satis- 
factory reply to our demand," you "will please transmit this afternoon 
5 o'clock (mid-European time), the following: * * * Russia having 
refused to comply with this demand, and having shown by this refusal 
that her action was directed against Germany. * * * i have the 
honor * * * to inform your Excellency as follows: — His Majesty the 
Emperor, my august Sovereign, in the name of the German Empire 
accepts the challenge, and considers himself at war with Russia."-" 
This was delivered at 7:10 p. m.=" 

England again urged that since Austria and Russia were willing to 
discuss matters, and if "Germany did not want war on her own ac- 
count" she "should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful 
settlement." The Secretary of State replied that "Austria's readiness to 
discuss was the result of German influence at Vienna, and, had not 
Russia mobilized all would have been well. But Russia by abstain- 
ing from answering Germany's demand that she should demobilize, 
had caused Germany to mobilize also. Russia had said that her 
mobilization did not necessarily imply war, and that she could per- 
fectly well remain mobilized for months without making war. This 
was not the case with Germany. She had the speed and Russia 
had the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbade that 
Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from 
all parts of her wide dominions.'"" 



210. CDD, p. 413 ; 2 SDD. 779 : GWB, Statement Aug. 3. 

211. CDD, 413 ; 2 SDD, 770 ; GWB, Statement Aug. 3. 

212. CDD, pp. 294, 433; 2 SDD, 1377, 811, No. 25; ROB, No. 76; GWB, 
No. 26. 

213. Same references. 

214. CDD, p. 100; 2 SDD, 993; BBB, No. 138. 



47 

According to the statement of the German Foreign office to the Ger- Germany 
man people, August 3, 1914, in the afternoon of August 1, before the fnv^e(?he?!'' 
delivery of the order declaring war "Russian troops crossed our 
frontier and marched into German territory. Thus Russia began 
war against us."=" This same document also says: "As the time 
limit given to Russia had expired without the receipt of a reply to 
our inquiry, H. M., the Kaiser ordered the mobilization of the entire 
German army and navy on August 1, at 5 p. m." In the document 
declaring war Russian moMlisation, not Russian invasion, is given as 
the cause of the declaration of war. 

Germ-any has constantly claimed that she did not mobilize until ^i.t['"|''^^ar is 
August 1, at 5 p. m., Saturday, and after Russia had mobilized against defensive one. 
her and had invaded her territory, and her war was, therefore, one of de- 
fence only, as claimed in the Kaiser's speech referred to in the early 
part of this paper. As to invasion of Germany by Russia: this is inher- 
ently improbable; Russia did not want war with Germany; she and Aus- 
tria were about to discuss, instead of fight; although she had given or- 
ders to mobilize before Germany claims to have given her order, yet 
Germany had the speed, and Russia the numbers when she got them to- 
gether, but since she certainly had not yet accomplished this, why should 
she attack Germany before she was ready? Besides, the Czar had 
given his word of bonor to the Kaiser that not a man should cross 
the line while negotiations continued. "We have already discussed 
what Germany had been doing in the way of mobilizing for the past 
15 days. 

As to these matters of invasion and mobilization it is well to re- Triple 
member a few bits of history. As we have seen the Triple Alliance, defenetve'^war. 
is one of defense, and not of offense. Austria and Italy were bound 
by it to stand by Germany only in case she were attacked by Russia. 
So, too, by the constitution of the German Empire, the Kaiser has 
no right to declare an offensive war, but only a defensive one."" As Conetitution 
we have seen, this war was declared by the Kaiser, and not by the ^!^ ^ ° 
Bundesrat; it had to be made a defensive one therefore. At the begin- 
ning of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870, it was said that "On July 19, 
at noon, a body of French soldiers crossed the Prussian frontier at 
Saarbrucken, and were driven back by the Uhlans. This was the Similar 
first hostile act committed before the formal declaration of war." Franco- 
Subsequent histories make no mention of this. It had a special pur- Prussian war. 
pose to subserve then: Bavaria was then bound only by a defensive 
alliance to Prussia, and was wavering in her support, in the dis- 
cussions in her legislative body, when this "act of hostility" was re- 



215. CDD, p. 413 ; 2 SDD, 780 ; GWB, Statement August 3. 

21G. "For a declaration of war in tbe name of the Empire, the consent of 
the Rundosrat is required, unless an attack is made upon the federal territory 
or its coasts." — IV, Art. 11, Dodd, Modern Constitutions, Vol. 1, p. 331. 



48 

ported at the proper time, and with the desired result.^'" So, here, 
Austria declared war on Russia, (August 6th), because slie "has seen 
fit to open hostilities against Germany."-" On August 1, however, 
Italy declared that this war was not a defensive one, but an aggressive 
war on the part of Austria, and she was not obliged under the terms 
of the Triple Alliance to take part in it."" Just as in the beginning 
of the Franco-Prussian war hostile acts of France were counted on 
as above noted, so when Germany declared war on France, at 6:45 
p. m., August 3, 1914, she claimed France was guilty of "a certain 
number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on German territory," 
specifying: "yesterday morning (August 2,) eighty French officers 
in Prussian uniform had attempted to cross the German frontier in 
tivelve motor cars at Walbeck"; and French military aviators have 
"attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel," and "throwii bombs on 
the railway near Carlsruhe, and Nuremburg." Now the 80 French 
officers in their 12 motor cars, would not only have to cross Belgium, 
but also 30 miles of Holland, to reach Walbeck; it is strange that 
they were seen by no one but Germans in their violation of the neutral 
territory of Belgium and Holland, on their 140 mile trip, and have 
not been heard from since; so, too, Wesel, is 150 miles from the 
French frontier, 30 of which is also across Holland; Carlsruhe is 85 
miles from France, and Nuremburg 200; these early aviators have 
made no report, — they seem still to be in the air. The German officer 
in command at Nuremburg has publicly denied that any bombing of 
the railway at that time occurred; and when the German govern- 
ment delivered her ultimatum to Belgium, August 2, she did not, 
and could not, allege any violation of Belgian territory by France, 
but only that she had "reliable information" of "the intention of 
France to march through Belgian territory against Germany." With 
these claims in mind, which were so far from the truth, the 
allegation that Russia began the war against Germany, does not 
carry much weight. It and the rest of them served their purpose, 
just as Bismarck's "modified" Ems telegram in 1870 did. 

The Kaiser, therefore, with full knowledge of the willingness of 
Austria and Russia to negotiate further, with the assurance that 
Russia would take no military action while the negotiations con- 
tinued, and would stop military preparations if he would do the 
same, deliberatelj^ refused, declared war, and blocked all possibility 
of peace. 

And this is "How Russia and her ruler betrayed Germany's confi- 
dence and thereby made the European war." 

217. Wilson, H. W.. New Light on Germany's Treachery, Nineteenth 
Century, June, 1917, pp. 1204-1214. 

218. CDD, pp. 298, 529 ; 2 SDD, 1381 ; 1 SDD, 117 ; FYB, No. 79 ; AIIB, 
No. 59. 

219. CDD, pp. 106, 228 ; 2 SDD. 1002 ; 1 SDD. G79 ; BBB, No. 152 ; FYB, 
No. 124. 



49 

Sunday, August 2, 1914. 

German troops violated French territory in at least 11 different Invasion of 
places, — at one, Joncliery, six miles from the frontier. Lieutenant 
Mayer of the 5th mounted Jagers, of the 144 army corps blew out the 
brains of a French corporal, and was himself killed, and two German 
troopers were taken prisoner;--" also invaded Luxemburg, and Ger- 
many demanded that permission be given by Belgium to Germany 
for her troops to cross Belgian territory to invade France. 

INVASION OF BELGIUM. 

By the settlement at the Congress of Vienna, in 1815, Holland and Neutrality of 
Belgium were joined together under the name of The Netherlands, ^^^^slum. 
This was not a happy union, and in 1830, Belgium declared her in- 
dependence of Holland; Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and 
Russia, by treaty xoith her in 1831, recognized her independence "as 
a perpetually neutral state," and "guaranteed perpetual neutrality." 
Holland then objected, but in 1839, joined these powers in a treaty Treaties. 
by which Belgium was to "form an independent and perpetually 
neutral state" placed "under the guarantee of" these powers, — this 
guarantee being considered from the beginning to be "to uphold, not 
collectively but severally and individually, the integrity of the treaty," 
and not jointly, as in the treaty of 1867, concerning the neutrality 
of Luxemburg."' 

By treaty of 1870, during the Franco-Prussian war, Prussia, (prac- 
tically on behalf of the North German Confederation, with which 
France was technically at war), declared her intention "to respect 
the neutrality of Belgium, so long as the same shall be respected by 
France" and England agreed to cooperate with Prussia, in case France 
violated that neutrality. This treaty between Prussia and England 
was to last during the continuance of the war and for 12 months 
after the ratification of peace, but "without impairing or invalidating 
the conditions of" the treaty of 1839, being only "subsidiary and 
accessory to it."--- A precisely similar treaty was entered into by 
England and France at the same time. 

In 1911, the German Chancellor had declared to Belgium "that Confirmation^i. 



220. CDD, pp. 234, 23G : 1 SDD, 686, 687, 689 ; FYB, Nos. 136, 130. The 
Gei-man Chancellor says this was against express orders ; GWB, Speech, Aug. 
4, CDD, p. 438. 

221. Mowat, R. B., Select Treaties, Oxford Pamphlets, Introduction, and pp. 
37, 42. Arts. 9 and 10 of Treaty of 1831, and Art. 7 of Treat.v of 1839. 

222. Mowat. Select Treaties, p. 39. Prof. Burgess, argues that Germanj- 
is not a party to either of these treaties, since they were not made with either 
her or the North German Confederation. He also says that Germany was 
not a party to the Hague Convention of 1907. As to this last he is mis- 
taken : as to the first, the original treaty of 1839 was made with his Majesty 
the "King of Prusma,'' the present Kaiser, is still King of Prussia, and by 
virtue of this, is Emperor of Germany. Besides the German Chancellor did 
not think of such a flimsy excuse. 



50 



Belgium's 
duty of self 
defense. 



France agrees 
to respect 
Belgian 
neutrality. 



Germany 



Germany had no intention of violating Belgian neutrality;" in 1913,. 
the German Secretary of State had publically declared to the Budget 
Commission of the Reichstag, that "Belgian neutrality is provided for 
by International Conventions, and Germany is determined to respect 
those conventions." On July 31, 1914, the German Minister to Belgium, 
upon specific inquiry, told the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
that he knew of these declarations of the Chancellor and Secretary 
of State, and "the sentiments expressed at that time had not changed." 
And again on August 2, (the day that Germany later in the day 
delivered her ultimatum to Belgium), the German Minister to Belgium 
confirmed "the feelings of security" which Belgium "had the right 
to entertain towards" her "eastern neighbors. "-= 

By the treaty of 1839, Belgium was bound to do all she could, to 
defend her own neutrality, in case it was threatened or invaded. The 
Hague Conference, 1907, declared the territory of neutral powers is 
inviolable, and belligerents are forbidden to move troops across it, 
and resistence is not an hostile act.='^ Germany had signed this 
declaration. 

July 24, 1914, Belgium mobilized her small army, and put her forts 
in a state of defense, and on the 29th "strengthened her peace foot- 
ing" in order to perform heir duty to protect her own neutrality.--^ 

July 31, the French Minister to Belgium, as soon as he learned of 
"the state of war in Germany" with Russia, immediately declared to 
the Belgian Foreign Minister, "that no incursion of French troops 
into Belgium will take place, even if considerable forces are massed, 
upon the frontiers of your country." The same day England asked 
Belgium if she would "do her utmost to maintain her neutrality," 
and also asked France and Germany if they would respect Belgian 
neutrality, if violated by no other power.-" 

France answered "Yes," at once, and on the same day so informed 
the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.-' The German Secretary 
of State answered "that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancel- 
lor before he could possibly answer," and for fear of disclosing part 
"of their plan of campaign," he was "very doubtful whether they would 
return any answer at all."-' The next day, Saturday, August 1, 
England insisted on an answer from Germany, saying "if there were a 
violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant while the other 



223. CDD, p. 305 ; 1 SDD, 366 ; BGB. No. 12. 

224. Convention V, Chapter I. Articles 1, 2, 10. Germany's claims that 
Belgium had violated her duty of neutrality by understanding with England 
prior to the war are too flimsev to need comment. 

225. CDD, pp. 300, 303 ; 1 SDD. 356. 364 ; BGB, Nos. 2, S. 

226. CDD, pp. 87, 307 ; 2 SDD. 976, 977 ; 1 SDD, 368 ; BBB, Nos. 114, 
115; BGB, No. 13. 

227. CDD, pp. 94, 227, 307 ; 2 SDD, 985 ; 1 SDD, 367, 369 ; BBB, No. 
125 ; FYB, No. 122 ; BGB, No. 15. 

228. ODD, pp. 92, 227 ; 2 SDD, 983 ; 1 SDD, 568 ; BBB, No. 92 ; FYB, 
No. 123. 



51 

respected it, it would be extremely difficult to restrain public feeling 
in this country.""" At 1:05 p. m. France answered Germany's ulti- 
matum to her of the night before, "that France would do that which 
her interest dictated."-^" "The Kaiser ordered the mobilization of the 
entire German Army and Navy on August 1st at 5 p. m.," according 
to the Chancellor, — "the first day of mobilization to be 2d August," 
according to the newspaper reports.-"^ (But see above.) France 
mobilized at 3:40 p. m.= '- 

Sunday, August 2, at 7 p. m. Germnmj presented an ultimatum Germany 
marked "very confidential" to Belgium, saying: "Reliable informa- u^tYi^atum to 

tion has been received by" Germany "that French forces intend to Belgium 

demandmg 
march * * * through Belgian territory against Germany," who fears permiesion to 

"that Belgium * * * will be unable without assistance to repel so to^France™^^ 
considerable a French invasion with sufficient prospect of success 
to * * * guarantee against danger to Germany. It is essential for 
the self-defense of Germany that she should anticipate such hostile 
attack." And would regret "if Belgium regarded as an act of hos- 
tility" the "fact that the measures of Germany's opponents force 
Germany, for her own protection, to enter Belgian territory." If 
this was permitted Germany proposed "at the conclusion of peace, 
to guarantee the possessions and independence of the Belgian King- 
dom in full;" "to evacuate Belgian territory at the conclusion of 
peace"; "to purchase all necessaries for her troops against a cash 
payment, and to pay an indemnity for any damage that may have 
been caused by German troops." Should Belgium oppose * * * Ger- 
many will, to her regret, be compelled to consider Belgium as an 
enemy," and "the eventual adjustment of relations between the two 
states must be left to the decision of arms.""^" "A time limit of 
twelve hours was allowed in which to reply."''^ At 1:30 a. m., the 
German Minister to Belgium, asked to see the Secretary General to 
the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to tell him "he had been 
instructed by his Government to inform the Belgian Government 
that French dirigibles had thrown bombs, and a French cavalry 
patrol had crossed the frontier in violation of international law." 
When asked, Where? he replied, "in Germany." The Secretary then 
said "he could not understand the object of the communication," — 
when the German Minister answered that "these acts, which were 
contrary to international law. were calculated to lead to the supposi- 
tion that other acts, contrary to international law, would be com- 



229. TDD, p. 9.3 ; 2 SDD, 984 : BBB. No. 123. 

230. CDD, pp. 434, 223; 2 SDD, 813, No. 26; 1 SDD, 673; GWB, Ex. 
26 ; FYB. No. 117. 

231. CDD, pp. 413, 103, 232 ; 2 SDD, 780, 997 ; 1 SDD, 784 ; GWB, State- 
ment Aug. 3 ; BBB, No. 142 : FYB. No. 130. 

232. CDD, p. 99 ; 2 SDD, 991 ; BBB. No. 136. 

233. CDD, pp. 309, 312 : 1 SDD. 371. 375 ; BGB. Nos. 20 23. 

234. CDD, p. 312 ; 1 SDD, 375 ; BGB, No. 23. 



oi: 



Belgium 
replies in 
negative. 



France 

offers 

support. 



England 

warns 

Germany. 



Germany 
declares war 
on Belgium. 



mitted by Prance."-" Six and a half hours earlier the German Gov- 
ernment could only allege "we knew that France was ready to invade 
Belgium"-^" according to the Chancellor, and make that, "the lying 
pretext that Belgian neutrality was threatened by us,"-" according to 
Viviani, as the basis of the ultimatum to Belgium. 

At 7 a. m. Monday, August 3, Belgium rejiUed:. "This note has 
made a deep and painful impression upon the Belgian Government. 
The intentions attributed to France by Germany" contradict France's 
formal declarations; if "Belgian neutrality should be violated by 
France," Belgium "would offer the most vigorous resistance." "The 
treaties of 1839" and 1870, "vouch for the independence and neutrality 
of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers" including Prussia. 
"Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations." 
"The attack upon her independence" which Germany threatens "con- 
stitutes a flagrant violation of international law. No strategic in- 
terest justifies such a violation of law." If Belgium "were to accept 
the proposals submitted," she "would sacrifice the honor of the 
nation and betray" her "duty towards Europe," and she is "firmly 
resolved to repel, by all the means in" her power, "every attack 
upon" her rights.- - Caesar said more than nineteen hundred years 
ago, "Of all the Gauls, the Belgae are the bravest.""' 

France immediately offered Belgium "the support of five French 
army corps," but she said she was "making no appeal at present to 
the guarantee of the powers."=" At 6:45 p. m., Germany declared 
war on France, because of the alleged acts of aggression above 
noted.-" Belgium appealed to England for diplomatic intervention 
on her behalf, and England immediately protested "against this viola- 
tion of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with" her, 
and requested an assurance from Germany that she would respect 
the neutrality of Belgium.^*' 

On Tuesday, August 4, England told Belgium that if Germany ap- 
plied pressure to induce her to depart from neutrality, she would 
expect her to resist by any means in her power, and she stood ready 
to join France and Russia "for the purpose of resisting use of force 
by Germany against" her.=^^ At 6 a. m., Germany declared war on 
Belgium, "in consequence of the refusal" by her "to entertain the 



235. CDD, p. 311 ; 1 SDD, 37.^, ; BGB, No. 21. 

236. CDD, p. 317 ; 1 SDD, 381 ; BGB. No. 35. 

237. CDD, p. 259 ; 1 SDD, 715 ; FYB, No. 159. 

238. CDD, pp. 311, 323 : 1 SDD, 373, 389 ; BGB, Nos. 22. 44. 

239. The area of Belgium is 11,373 sq. mi. : population. 7.500.000 ; Ger- 
many, area, 208.000 sq. mi.; population. 67,000,000. In 1914, Belgium's war 
strength was 222,000, and Germany's, 5.200,000. 

240. CDD, pp. 106, 313 ; 2 SDD. 1001 ; 1 SDD, 375 ; BBB, No. 151 ; BGB, 
No. 24. 

241. CDD, pp. 240, 241 ; 1 SDD, 693. 694 : FYB. Nos. 147, 148. 

242. CDD, pp. 107, 313; 2 SDD. 1002; 1 SDD. 376; BBB, No. 153; BGB, 
No. 25. 

243. CDD, p. 108; 2 SDD, 1003; BBB, No. 155. 



well-intentioned proposals" of Germany,'" and immediately proceeded 
to invade her territory.-" 

The reasons given by the German Chancellor were: "We were in Reasons 
a state of legitimate defence, and necessity knows no law. Our troops neclssity. 
have occupied Luxemburg and have perhaps already entered Belgium. 
This is contrary to * * * international law. France has * * * de- 
clared * * * that she was prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium 
so long as it was respected by her adversary. But we knew that 
France was ready to invade Belgium. France could wait; we could 
not. A French attack upon our flank * * * might have been fatal. We 
were, therefore, compelled to ride roughshod over the legitimate pro- 
tests" of Luxemburg and Belgium. "For the wrongs which we are 
thus doing, we will make reparation as soon as our mili- 
tary object is attained." "He who is menaced as we are 
and is fighting for his highest possession can only con- 
sider how he is to hack his way through."-^'' The German Secre- 
tary of State gave as reasons that Germany "had to advance into 
France by the quickest and easiest way,"-^' and the Kaiser (in his 
suppressed cablegram to President Wilson, August 10, 1914), because 
of "strategical grounds, nc^vs having been received that France was 
already preparing to enter Belgium." (In the original, the word 
knowledge, was crossed out, and news, written instead.)-"* 

Belgium appealed "to Great Britain, France, and Russia to co-oper- Belgium 
ate as guaranteeing powers in the defence of her territory."-^" Ger- powers. 
many sent word to England that she "will, under no pretense what- 
ever, annex Belgian territory"; the "German army could not be ex- 
posed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned accord- 
ing to absolutely unimpeachable information. "''" 

England again requested Germany to give assurances by midnight EnKland's 
to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and proceed no further with German™ 
their violation of "her frontier," and if not given then England would 
"feel bound to take all steps in" her "power to uphold the neutrality 
of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as 
much a party as" England.-"^ 

That afternoon, the German Secretary of State answered "No," say- Germany's 
ing the German troops had crossed the frontier in the morning, and onl^'^'^aTcrap 
"Belgian neutrality had been already violated. * * * the safety of o^ paper." 



244. CDD. p. 314 ; 1 SDD. .377 ; BOB, No. 27. 

245. CDD. pp. 100, 316, 321 ; 2 SDD, 1005 ; 1 SDD, 379, 386 ; BBB. No. 
158 : BGB, Nos. 30. 40. 

246. CDD, pp. 317, 438 : 1 SDD, 381 : BGB. No. 35 ; GWB. Appendix, 
CbancelIor'.s Speecli to tlie ReichstaR, August 4, 1914. 

247. CDD, p. 110; 2 SDD. 1000; BBB, No. 160. 

248. Ambassador Gerard's "My Four Years in Germany," p. 438 ; Plill. 
Public Ledger, Aug. 5, 1917. 

249. CDD. p. 321 ; 1 SDD, 386 ; BGB, No. 40. 

250. CDD, p. 109; 2 SDD, 1004; BBB. No. 157. 

251. CDD, p. 109, 110; 2 SDD, 1005; BBB. Nos. 159, IGO. 



54 



England's 
reply. 



the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial 
troops should advance through Belgium." And that evening the 
Chancellor said that the step taken by England "was terrible to a 
degree; just for a word — 'neutrality,' a word which in war time had 
so often been disregarded — just for a scrap of paper Great Britain 
was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing 
better than to be friends with her."-^- 

England replied "for the honor of Great Britain, she should keep 
her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutral- 
ity if attacked, "-^^ and "Germany, having rejected the British pro- 
posals" declared "that a state of war existed between the two countries 
as from 11 o'clock" that night.^^* 



ENGLAND'S RESPONSIBILITY. 



Germany- 
first blames 
Russia. 



Then 
England 



The statement of the German Foreign Office, August 3, 1914, says: 
"Russia began the war against us," and the German Chancellor the 
next day said to the Reichstag, "Russia has set fire to the building. 
We are at war with Russia and France, — a war that has been forced 
upon us." 

In the Chancellor's speech, four months later, December 2, he de- 
clares that while the outer responsibility for the war is on Russia, 
the inner, lies upon England, for she gave Russia to understand 
that she placed herself at the side of Russia and France; she could 
have made it impossible, had she declared she would not suffer a 
European war to grow out of the Austro-Servian dispute; France 
would then have energetically warned Russia against military action; 
"then the way would have been clear for our mediatory action." 

Russia's efforts Rii^ssia's efforts toward peace have already been set forth in detail; 

peace^^^"^^^ from the first she declared she could not stand by and see Servia 
crushed, deprived of her integrity and independence, and become a 
vassal of Austria; she held to this throughout, yet in the beginning, 
(July 26) she told Austria that her claims were legitimate if she 
had no other aim than the protection of her territory against the 
intrigues of Servian anarchists; but her procedure was indefensible, 
and Sazanof said: "Take back your ultimatum, modify its form, and 
I will guarantee you the result" ;''' and at the end he accurately sum- 
med up his efforts, saying he "was completely weary of the ceaseless 
endeavors he had made to avoid war. No suggestions held out to 
him had been refused. He had accepted the proposal for a confer- 
ence of four, for mediation by Great Britain and Italy, for direct con- 
versations between Austria and Russia; but Germany and Austria- 



252. CDD, pp. 110, 111 ; 2 SDD, 1000, 1007 ; BBB, No. 160. 

253. CDD, p. Ill ; 2 SDD, 1007 ; BBB. No. 160. 

254. CDD, p. 322 ; 1 SDD, 387 ; BOB. No. 41. 

255. CDD, p. 177 ; 1 SDD. 606 ; FYB, No. 54, 



Hungary had either rendered these attempts for peace ineffective by- 
evasive replies or had refused them altogther."^'" 

France from the beginning told Russia that she would support her France's 

, position, 
in negotiations, and as an ally in case of necessity; a course she 

adhered to throughout, yet supporting every effort tovc^ard peace made 

by any of the parties, counseling moderation at all times, and on the 

29th July, at the critical time, inducing Russia to suspend for the time 

being every military measure that could offer Germany any pretext 

for general mobilization.^"''' 

We have already seen above how, from the very first, (July 24), England's 
England, although strongly urged, refused to make any engagement P°"' '°^' 
to support Russia and France by force of arms.'"'^ On July 25, Russia 
and Germany were informed that while the conflict continued be- 
tween Austria and Servia alone, British interests were only indirectly 
affected, but Austrian mobilization might lead to Russian mobiliza- 
tion; then the interests of all the powers would be involved, in which 
case England "reserved to herself full liberty of action," and refused 
then to bring "conciliatory pressure" on Russia, at Germany's re- 
quest.-'" 

On the 27th, the German and Austrian ambassadors in London al- Warns 
lowed it to be understood that they were sure England would re- early!^"^ 
main neutral if a conflict broke out,^'^'' but the German ambassador 
was immediately informed otherwise.^"^ On the 29th Sir Edward 
Grey made still clearer England's position to France and Germany. 
He told the French ambassador that in a "Balkan quarrel, and in 
a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not 
feel called to intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany 
and France became involved, so that the questions became one of 
the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what it was neces- 
sary for us to do";-''- and to the German ambassador he said: "There 
would be no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, 
or even if France was not involved"; but if British interests required 
us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would 
have to be very rapid.""^ At the same time he told both that they 
should not be misled by these statements, — France into relying upon 
England's support, or Germany into thinking she would stand aside. 

'We have already told how England declined Germany's bid for her Refuses 
neutrality, made this day, the 29th. On the 30th the French Presi- bidto"^'^ 
neutrality. 

256. CDD. p. 101; 2 SDD, 994; BBB, No. 139. 

257. CDD, p. 211 ; 1 SDD, 659 ; FYB, No. 102. 

258. CDD, pp. 14, 163 ; 2 SDD, 880 ; 1 SDD, 584 ; BBB, No. 14 ; FYB, 
No. 163. 

259. CDD, p. 273 ; 2 SDD, 1348 ; ROB, No. 20. 

260. CDD, p. 185 ; 1 SDD, 616 ; FYB. So. 63. 

261. CDD, p. 43 ; 2 SDD. 918 ; also, CDD, p. 41 ; 2 SDD, 917 ; BBB, Nos. 
47, 48 ; also CDD, p. 282 ; 2 SDD, 1359 ; ROB, No. 42. 

262. CDD, p. 65; 2 SDD, 948; BBB, No. 87. 

263. CDD, p. 67; 2 SDD, 950; BBB, No. 89. 



5G 



dent again urged England to agree to come to her aid in case of a 
war between France and Germany, saying "tliere would then be no 
war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude," but England 
declined.-" The next day in answer to a direct question by the Ger- 
man ambassador, whether Great Britain would remain neutral, he was 
told that if the conflict became general, and especially if France were 
involved, England would not be able to remain neutral, but would 
be brought in; at the same time France was informed that England 
could not then guarantee intervention on behalf of France, "but it 
was necessary to wait for the situation to develop."-"^ Although 
England had several times refused to agree to stand solidly with 
Russia and France, Russia today thanked her for "the firm attitude" 
and "firm and friendly tone" adopted by her.-"" On the 2d of August, 
however, subject to the approval of Parliament, Sir Edward Grey 
assured France that "if the German fleet comes into the Channel or 
through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French 
coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its 
power," but this "did not bind" England to go to war with Germany 
unless she took the action stated.-'" 

Such is the Record of England; she gave neither Russia, France, 
nor Germany to understand that she placed herself at the side of 
Russia and France; the only way she could have made the war im- 
possible, in the way the Chancellor stated, was to have told Russia 
and France that Austria and Germany were to have a free hand, 
under any circumstances. 

Only in such a sense can England be said to be responsible, at 
least so far as Germany and Austria are concerned. But further as to 
the Chancellor's charge against England. The German documents 
themselves exonerate England from this charge. In the statement 
of the German Government sent to King George, August 1, 1914, that 
"The proposals made by the German Government at Vienna were 
conceived entirely on the lines suggested by Great Britain, and the 
German Government recommended them at Vienna for their serious 
consideration."-''* And the official statement of the German Foreign 
Office, August 3, 1914, says "Shoulder to shoulder with England we 
labored incessantly and supported every proposal in Vienna" offer- 
ing the possibility of peace."'' These relate to efforts claimed to 
have been made at Vienna. — and admit, by implication at least, none 
were made there by Germany except such as England suggested. 

But as to Russia, the Chancellor himself says in his speech, August 



; SDD. 962 ; BBB, No. 99. 
543 ; 1 SDD, 667 ; 2 SDD, 1029 : 



FYB, No. 110; Tele- 



264. CDD, p. 76; 

265. CDD, pp. 217 
grams, etc., V. 1. 

266. CDD, pp. 91. 291; 2 SDD. 981. 1374; BBB, No. 120; ROB. No. 69. 

267. CDD, p. 105; 2 SDD. 999; BBB, No. 148. 

268. CDD, p. 536 ; 2 SDD, 1020 ; Ti^legrams, (?tc.. I. 1. 

269. CDD, p. 410 ; 2 SDD, 777 ; GWB, Statement, Aug. 3. 



57 

4, 1914: "Great Britain, warmly supported by us, tried to mediate 
between Vienna and St. Petersburg." And tlie declaration of war by 
Germany against Russia, August 1, says "the German Emperor had 
undertaken, in concert with Great Britain, the part of mediator be- 
tween the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg." Here again Great 
Britain's efforts at mediation with Russia, are admitted. "Our (Ger- 
many's) mediatory action," therefore was not blocked, by England, 
either at Vienna or St. Petersburg. 

But ivhat of German mediations' That it was being continuously ex- German 

-.^ . ^, , mediation, 

ercised, is constantly asserted, over and over again, by Kaiser, Chancel- 
lor, and Secretary of State. So much so that "The lady doth protest 
too much, methinks." The terms of not a single peace proposal by 
Germany is divulged by the published records. There is nothing but 
assertion, and demand of "localization," "no intervention," or "demobil- 
ization," under threat of mobilization by Austria or Germany, re- 
vealed by the documents, as the method of German mediation. It 
was not only sterile of peaceful results, but had exactly the opposite 
effect. Its absolute failure was attributed by Germany to the un- 
approachably haughty touchiness of Austria, or the "mobilization," 
or "invasion," by Servia, Russia, or France, bent on attacking their 
peace-loving neighbors, Austria and Germany. i 

FACTS NOT IN THE RECORD. 

Such is the result of the published official records, with the few Matters not 
additional facts referred to in the notes. There are, also, some other 
matters, not in the official records, yet fully established, that are 
necessary to complete the story. Two of these are: Further facts 
as to Germany's prior knowledge of the Servian ultimatum, and the 
Potsdam meeting. 

As to the first: Herr von Jagow, the German Secretary of State, Germany's 
on July 21st, before the ultimatum was delivered, told the Russian Austrian 
and French representatives at Berlin, "That he was in complete ultimatum, 
ignorance of the contents of that note."-'" The next day he repeated 
"he knew nothing of the text."-'^ On the 24th, the day after the note 
was delivered to Servia, when asked by the French Ambassador at 
Berlin, "if the Berlin Cabinet had really been entirely ignorant of 
Austria's requirements before they were communicated to Belgrade," 
said, "that that was so."-'- On the 25th, in answer to a similar in- 
quiry by the English representative at Berlin, "he received so clear 
reply in the negative that he was not able to carry the matter 
further."-" On the same day the German ambassador at London read 



270. CDD, p. 149 ; 1 SDD, 502 : FYB. No. 15. 

271. CDD. p. 149; 1 SDD. 563; FYB, No. 17. 

272. CDD, p. 161; 1 SDD, 582; FYB, No. 30. 

273. CDD, p. 169 ; 1 SDD, 592 ; FYB, No. 41. 



58 



a telegram to Sir Edward Grey, from the German Foreign Office say- 
ing "that his government had not known beforehand, and had had 
no more than other Powers to do with the stiff terms of the Austrian 
note to Servia."-" England immediately sent this word to Russia.-" 
At the same time the German ambassador at Paris said "that there 
had been no 'concert' between Austria and Germany in connection with 
the Austrian note, and that the German Government had no knowl- 
edge of this note when it was communicated to them at the same 
time as to the other Powers, though they had approved it subse- 
quently."-"' And on this same day, 25th July, the German ambassa- 
dor to Russia, handed a verbal note to the Russian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, saying: "We learn from an authoritative source that 
the news spread by certain newspapers to the effect that the action 
of Austria at Belgrade, was instigated by Germany, is absolutely 
false. The German Government had no knowledge of the text of 
the Austrian note before it was presented, and exercised no influence 
upon its contents. A threatening attitude is wrongly attributed to 
Germany."-"' July 26th, the German ambassador at Paris again 
"affirmed that Germany had been ignorant of the text of the Austrian 
note, and had only approved it after its delivery."-" This was re- 
iterated the 28th.='^ And finally in the Official Statement August 3, 
of the German Foreign Office, it is said "We guaranteed Austria a 
completely free hand, but have not participated in her preparations."^^* 

On the other hand, on July 23d, the President of the Bavarian 
Council told the French Minister at Munich that "the contents of the 
Austrian note were known to him."-'^ On the 24th Sazonof, the 
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs declared that Austria "would 
never have taken such action unless Germany had first been con- 
sulted,"-*- and this was the universal belief, despite the German de- 
nials. On the 30th the British ambassador at Vienna reports that 
"Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information that 
the German Ambassador (here) knew the text of the ultimatum 
before it was despatched and telegraphed it to the German Emperor."^*^ 
Such is what the record shows. 

But since this was published other facts have become known: On 
September 3, 1916, Count Tisza, President of the Hungarian Ministry, 
in answer to the question if he had not talked over the Austrian 
note to Servia with German officials, said: "I do not care to answer 



274. 


CDD, 


p. 


2.5; 


2 SDD, 896; 


BBB, No. 25. 


275. 


CDD, 


p. 


273: 


; 2 SDD, 1348 


; ROB, No. 20. 


276. 


CDD, 


p. 


166 


; 1 SDD, 588; 


FYB, No. 36. 


277. 


CDD, 


P- 


272; 


; 2 SDD, 1347 


; ROB, No. 18. 


278. 


CDD, 


p. 


181: 


; 1 SDD. 610; 


FYB, No. 57. 


279. 


CDD, 


p. 


196 : 


; 1 SDD, 640; 


FYB. No. 78. 


280. 


CDD, 


p. 


406; 


: 2 SDD, 773. 




281. 


CDD, 


p. 


153 


; 1 SDD. 567; 


FYB. No. 21. 


282. 


CDD, 


p. 


14; 


2 SDD. 880: BBB. No. 6. 


283. 


CDD, 


P- 


74 ; 


2 SDD, 959 ; 


BBB. No. 95. 



59 

that question directly. But you can draw your own conclusions. If 
a person has a very close and strong friend, and if he is about to 
take a step of the most terrible gravity, does he, or does he not, 
discuss the whole matter with his friend, and finally tell his friend 
what he has decided to do?" Three weeks later, Von Jagow, himself, 
the German Secretary of State, when asked a question, based on what 
Tisza had divulged, said: "I did not have a hand in preparing the 
note. * * * I saw it at 8 o'clock the night before it was presented 
in Belgrade, where it was presented at 10 o'clock the next morning. 
That was too late to do anything about it. All we had done was to 
assure Austria that we would back her up in an attempt to punish 
Serbia."-^^ (The note reached Belgrade at 10 o'clock, but was not 
actually delivered until 6 p. m.) 

Again, July 14, eight days before the note was delivered, Baron 
Wangenheim, German ambassador at Constantinople, told the Italian 
ambassador there that "the Austrian note to Serbia would be such as 
to render war inevitable."-'"^ 

And again: In the middle of July, 1914, Dr. Muhlon then a director The Kaiser 
of Krupp's Works, at Eisen, was told by Dr. Helfferich, then a director approved. 
of the Deutsche Bank, in Berlin, and later Vice-Chancellor of Ger- 
many, the following: "The Austrians have just been with the Kaiser. 
In a week's time Vienna will send a very severe ultimatum to Servia 
with a very short interval for the answer. * * * The ultimatum will 
contain certain demands such as punishment of a number of officers, 
dissolution of political associations, criminal investigation by Aus- 
trian officials, and in fact a whole series of definite satisfactions will 
be demanded at once; otherwise Austria will declare war on Serbia; 
* * * the Kaiser expressed his decided approval of this procedure, 
and regarded a conflict with Serbia as an internal affair between 
these two countries, in which he would permit no other state to in- 
terfere. If Russia mobilized, he would mobilize, and mobilization 
meant immediate war." When this was reported to Herr Krupp von 
Bohlen, he confirmed it and added, "the Kaiser had told him he would 
declare war immediately if Russia mobilized, and that this time 
people would see that he would not turn about. * * * No one would 
be able to accuse him of indecision." On the day the Austrian ulti- 
matum appeared Dr. Helfferich told Dr. Muhlon, "the Kaiser had gone 
on his northern cruise as a blind, but was remaining close at hand 
and keeping in close touch." The German Government's reply to 
Dr. Muhlon's statement is that "the author is in a 'pathological state,' 
and consequently not responsible."^^" 



284. W. C. Bullitt, interview with Tisza and Von Jagow, Phil. Pub. Ledger, 
Aug. 6, 1917. 

2S5. Speech of M. Barzilai, of the Italian Government, at Naples, Sept. 
24, 1915, — Facts about the War, No. 22. p. 3. 

286. Pacts about the War, No. 82, May, 191S ; Germany's Confession, U. 
S. Committee on Public Information. 



GO 



But still further: Dr. E. J. Dillon, Special Correspondent from south- 
eastern Europe for the London Daily Telegraph, and an authority on 
European Affairs, says as to the Austrian ultimatum: "Nothing was 
kept back from the politicians of the Wilhelmsrasse but the rough 
draft of the note. The German ambassador, von Tschirscky, however, 
was one of the few who were initiated into that mystery; * * * (he) 
saw the proposed text of the ultimatum; * * * it was he who tele- 
graphed the wording of the document to the Kaiser. * * * I advance 
this statement with a full knowledge of what actually took place. 
This communication was made not merely for the purpose of keeping 
the War Lord informed, * * * but also to secure his express assent 
to exact terms of an official paper which was intended to bring about 
hostilities between Austria and Servia, and might * * * precipitate 
a European conflict; * * * the rough draft did not obtain (his) un- 
conditional approval; (he) suggested a certain amendment, and fixed 
a time limit * * * to leave no room for evasion or loophole for escape; 
* * * the verbal amendments,^ — to sharpen the terms — were embodied 
in the ultimatum, * * * and duly presented."-"' 

Now as to the Potsdam meeting. September 14, 1914, a Berlin cor- 
respondent telegraphed to his Rotterdam paper that a Crown Council 
was held at Potsdam, July 5, 1914. July 19, 1917, Herr Haase, Ger- 
man minority Socialist leader, in the Reichstag, said: "What the peace 
resolution says of the origin of the war is not tenable in fact or in 
history. * * * We do not forget the conference at Berlin on July 
5, 1914." This was published only in the Leipziger Tolkszeitung, the 
next morning; the allusion to this meeting was suppressed in the 
reports of the Reichstag proceedings, published in other German 
papers. No member of the German Government, then challenged the 
statement. 

With these clues, a London Times reporter, July 27, 1917, ascertained 
that there was such a meeting held, a week after the murder of the 
Archduke, Franz Ferdinand. "Those who took part in the conference 
were: the Emperor, his Chancellor von Bethemann-Hollweg, Admiral 
Tirpitz, General Palkenhayen, Mr. "Von Strumm, Count Berchtold. 
Count Tisza, the Austrian and Hungarian Premiers, General Conrad 
von Hoetzendorf, the chief of the Austro-Hungarian staff. They dis- 
cussed and settled the chief points of the ultimatum that Austria was 
to send, eighteen days later, to Serbia;" it was recognized that Russia 
would object; that war would result; but it was definitely decided to 
accept this; the date of mobilization was probably fixed; the Kaiser 
left for Norway to throw dust in the eyes of France and Russia. Two 
months before, at a secret meeting of the Budget Committee of the 
Reichstag, a Socialist member, Cohn, challenged the minister to deny 



287 



'A scrap of Paper," by E. .T. Dillon. 1014, pp. 



61 

these facts, but he did not do so. August 1, 1917, the German Gov- Denied by 



German 
government. 



ernment issued an official denial, and authorized the Wolff Bureau to 
declare "these statements and all the details were pure invention; 
that neither on the day named, nor any other day in July, did such 
a conference occur either with or without the Emperor; and that the 
Government was completely ignorant of the contents of the ultimatum 
before its despatch. "=*'* 

But since then a fuller account of this meeting has been given by Morgenthau's 
Mr. Morgenthau, American Ambassador at Constantinople, who had infomlation. 
it first hand from Baron Wangenheim, German Ambassador at Con- 
stantinople, who attended the meeting at the summons of the Kaiser. 
Mr. Morganthau says: "This meeting took place at Potsdam, July Kaiser directs. 
5, (1914); the Kaiser presided; nearly all the ambassadors attended; 
Wangenheim came to tell of Turkey. * * * Molkte, chief of staff, was 
there representing the army, and Admiral von Tirpitz spoke for the 
navy. The great bankers, railroad directors and captains of German 
industry, all of whom were as necessary to German war preparations 
as the army itself, also attended. Wangenheim now told me that 
the Kaiser solemnly put the question to each man in turn. Was he 
ready for war? All replied, "Yes," except the financiers. They said 
that they must have two weeks to sell their foreign securities and 
to make loans. This conference * * * decided to give the bankers 
time to readjust their finances for the coming war, and then the sev- 
eral members went quietly back to their work or started on vacations. 
The Kaiser went to Norway in his yacht. Von Bethmann-HoUweg 
left for a rest, and Wangenheim returned to Constantinople. In 
telling me about this conference Wangenheim, of course, admitted that 
Germany precipitated the war. I think he was rather proud of the 
whole performance. * * * * f^e conspiracy that has caused this 
greatest of human tragedies was hatched by the Kaiser and his im- 
perial crew at the Potsdam conference of July 5, 1914."-'" 

All these matters have been lately more fully confirmed if possible. Confirmation 
by the publication of Prince Lichnoto sky's "My London Mission, 1912- ambassador 
1914," prepared by him in August, 1916, "for his family archives," ^° England. 
but copies of which were furnished to a few friends, including the 
head of the Hamburg-American Line, the head of the Deutsche Bank, 
the editor of the Berliner Tageblatt, and to an officer connected with 
the German General Staff. Through a breach of confidence his state- 
ment was made public. Prince Lichnowsky was German Ambassador 
to England, for the two years immediately preceding the commence- 
ment of the war. Among many other things he says: "I learned 
that at the decisive conversation at Potsdam on July 5, the inquiry 



288. Phil. Pub. Ledger, Monday, August G, 1917, p. 2. Facts about the 
War, No. GO, August, 1917. 

289. World's Work, June, 1918, pp. 170-171. 



6- 



Lichnoweky' 
summary. 



Germany's 
bad faith. 



addressed to us by Vienna found absolute assent among all the per- 
sons in authority; indeed they added that there would be no harm 
if war with. Russia were to result. So at any rate it is stated in the 
Austrian protocol which Count Mensdorf, Austrian Ambassador, re- 
ceived in London. Soon after Herr von Jagow was in Vienna to dis- 
cuss everything with Count Berchtold, Austrian Foreign Minister." 
He summarizes the whole action of Germany, as follows: 

"As appears from all official publications, without the facts 
being controverted by our own White Book, which, owing to 
its poverty and gaps, constitutes a grave self-accusation: 

1. "We encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Servia, al- 
though no German interest was involved, and the danger of a 
world war must have been known to us, — whether we knew 
the text of the ultimatum is a question of complete indiffer- 
ence." 

2. "In the days before July 2.3, and July 30, 1914, when M. 
Sazonof emphatically declared that Russia could not tolerate 
an attack on Servia, we rejected the British proposals of media- 
tion, although Servia, under Russian and British pressure, had 
accepted almost the whole ultimatum, and although an agree- 
ment about the two points in question could easily have been 
reached, and Count Berchtold was even ready to satisfy him- 
self with the Servian reply." 

3. "On July 30, when Count Berchtold wanted to give way, 
we, without Austria having been attacked, replied to Russia's 
mere mobilization by sending an ultimatum to St. Petersburg, 
and on July 31, we declared war on the Russians, although the 
Czar had pledged his word that as long as negotiations con- 
tinued, not a man should march, — so that we deliberately 
destroyed the possibility of a peaceful settlement." 

"In view of these indisputable facts, it is not surprising that 
the whole civilized world outside Germany attributes to us the 
sole guilt for the World War."=°'' 
And Dr. Dernburg, formerly the Kaiser's personal representative in 
this country, correctly characterizes Germany's bad faith when he 
says: "Our lies are coarse and improbable, our ambiguity is pitiful 
simplicity, and our intrigues are without salt and without grace. The 
history of this war proves this by a hundred examples."-"^ 
Truly this war was "made in Germany" and nowhere else. 
Austria, urged by Germany, precipitated the conflict for the domina- 
tion of the Balkans, — but at the last moment drew back; Germany 
then forced the war for her own schemes of world dominion; Russia 
honorably came to the rescue of a weak, kindred nation, but at the 



290. New York Times. April 21, 1918. 

291. In Deutsche Politik, September 28, 1911 



War Cyclopedia, p. 112. 



3477-1 Id 
62 



63 

same time had important interests of her own to preserve and pro- 
tect; France, valiant and glorious, rushed to the defence of her rights 
and her liberty; England, for her own honor, and likewise to preserve 
her own interests, nobly came to the aid of Belgium, France and 
Russia. 

But Belgium? — with her little army, and her forts without modern 
equipment, — in the eighteen days of her agony from Liege to Mons, 
she stemmed the onrush of the Hun deluge, until France could revise 
her plan of defense, and the little army of English heroes could reach 
the battle line. Belgium! disinterested Belgium! In the dim watches 
of the night, from Sunday 7 p. m. to Monday 7 a. m., August 2-3, 
1914, — with her peace, her prosperity, her safety, and her life itself, 
on one side, and her honor on the other, — chose honor, and the cross, — 
and was crucified, — even as Christ of old, — that the rest of us might 
be free. Henceforth her hallowed land shall be the Gethsemane of 
the Nations, — and all the world looks forward, with hope, for the 
day of her resurrection. 

And lohat of Germany? "Belshazzar, the king, made a great feast 
to a thousand of his lords .... They drank wine and praised the 
gods of gold, and of silver, of brass, of iron, of wood, and of stone. 
.... And fingers of a man's hand wrote upon the plaster of the 
wall of the king's palace: Mene; God hath numbered thy kingdom 
and finished it. Tekel; Thou art weighed in the balances and found 
wanting." "Babylon the great is fallen, is fallen, and is become the 
habitation of devils and the hold of every foul spirit and a cage for 
every unclean and hateful bird .... her sins have reached unto 
heaven and God hath remembered her iniquities. . . . Therefore 
shall her plagues come in one day, death and mourning and famine 

and the merchants of the earth shall weep and mourn over 

her; for no man buyeth their merchandise any more cinna- 
mon and odors and ointments and frankincense and wine and oil 
and fine flour and wheat and beasts and sheep and horses and chariots 
and slaves and the souls of men." Dan. V, 1-27; Rev. XVIII, 2 et seq. 



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